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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
IMPLICATIONS OF FIN 46 FOR ACCRUALS QUALITY 
AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
by 
Fang Zhao 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Abhijit Barua, Major Professor 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 
(FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, 
in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with the objective to improve the 
transparency of financial information. Under FIN 46, companies are required to 
consolidate variable interest entities (VIEs) on financial statements if they are the primary 
beneficiaries of the VIEs. This dissertation empirically examines whether the 
implementation of this new financial reporting guidance affects firms’ accruals quality 
and investment efficiency. A manually collected sample comprised of firms affected by 
FIN 46 and firms disclosing no material impact from FIN 46 is used in the empirical 
analyses.        
 The first part of the dissertation investigates the effects of FIN 46 on accruals 
quality. By using different accrual quality measures in prior studies, this study found that 
firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in accrual quality compared to firms 
reporting no material impact from FIN 46. Among the firms affected by FIN 46, firms 
consolidating VIEs were compared with firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. The 
vii 
 
accruals quality of firms consolidating VIEs was found to be lower than that of firms 
terminating or restructuring VIEs. These results are consistent in tests using alternative 
control samples. 
 The second part of this dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on investment 
efficiency. Mixed results were found from using two different proxies used in prior 
literature. Using the investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy for investment efficiency, 
firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in investment efficiency compared to 
firms reporting no material impact. It was also found that higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity for firms consolidating VIEs during post-FIN 46 periods compared to both the 
no-impact firms and the matched pair control sample. Contrasting results were found 
when the deviation from expected investment is used as another proxy for investment 
efficiency. Empirical analyses show that FIN 46 firms experienced improved investment 
efficiency measured by the deviation from expected investment after their adoption of 
FIN 46. This study also provides explanations for the opposite results from the two 
different proxies. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 The Enron Scandal in 2001 uncovers the financial reporting problems related to 
off-balance sheet debts and undisclosed losses from income statements by using special 
purpose entities (SPEs). In response to the widespread misuse of the consolidation rules 
relating to SPEs, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation 
No. 46 (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB 
No. 51, in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with the objective to improve 
the transparency of financial information.1 Under FIN 46, companies are required to 
consolidate SPEs on the financial statements if they are the primary beneficiaries of the 
SPEs, regardless of their voting interests in the entities.2 This study investigates whether 
the implementation of this new guide affects accruals quality and investment efficiency 
of firms impacted by FIN 46.  
 The first part of my dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on accruals 
quality. By using SPEs, firms gain more flexibility to manage reported earnings and debts 
since sponsoring firms control both entities. Prior studies provide evidence that firms 
manage earnings through off-balance sheet items (e.g., Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; 
Feng et al. 2009; Dechow et al. 2010). Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) find that firms 
manage earnings by timing securitizations of assets by using SPEs. Feng et al. (2009) 
document that SPEs created for financial reporting purposes are more likely to be used to 
manage earnings. Their tests all focus on the pre-FIN 46 periods. Since FIN 46 mandates 
new consolidation rules and disclosure provisions for firms with SPEs, resultant 
                                                 
1 The revised version is FIN 46 (R). In this paper, I use FIN 46 to refer to both FIN 46 and FIN 46 (R). 
 
2  SPE is the general term for the off-balance sheet special purpose entities. SPEs subject to FIN 46 are 
named variable interest entities (VIEs) under FIN 46.  
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enhanced transparency is expected to decrease opportunistic earnings management (Lobo 
and Zhou 2001; Hunton et al. 2006), thus improving the accrual quality. However, the 
accrual quality of firms impacted by FIN 46 may also deteriorate. Previous studies show 
that when one method of earnings management becomes costly or restrained, firms will 
resort to alternative ways to manage earnings (e.g., Zhang 2012; Chi et al. 2011). When 
firms are affected by FIN 46 and their VIEs are consolidated, they lose the reporting 
flexibilities that could be used to manage earnings. Impacted firms may resort to other 
methods, such as manipulating accounting accruals, in order to manipulate earnings on 
the consolidated financial statements. Thus, it is an empirically open question whether the 
implementation of FIN 46 has improved or deteriorated the accrual quality of affected 
firms.    
 To address this question, I compared accruals quality of firms affected by FIN 46 
before and after the implementation of this accounting pronouncement. I used a manually 
identified sample of firms by examining their SEC filings (i.e., 10-K and 10-Q) and form 
three groups: (1) consolidation (on-book) group – consists of firms that have consolidated 
VIEs on their financial statements, (2) off-book group – consists of of firms that have 
restructured or terminated VIEs to avoid consolidation, and (3) no material impact group 
– consists of firms that have disclosed no material impact from FIN 46. In most analyses, 
I compared the accruals quality of consolidation group and off-book group while using 
no-material impact group as a control. In addition, I also used a matched pair control 
group to check the robustness of my results. I employed a difference-in-differences 
approach to test the difference in accruals quality between pre-and post-implementation 
of FIN 46. In pre-post tests, I used a sample period of four years before and four years 
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after the implementation of FIN 46.  I conducted tests using three different sets of accrual 
quality measures: the absolute value of abnormal accruals,  accruals estimation errors, 
and the standard deviation of accruals estimation errors. For abnormal accrual measures, I 
measured performance-matched abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals 
following Kothari et al. (2005). In order to measure accrual estimation errors I used the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002, DD model hereinafter) model and the modified version of 
DD model suggested by McNichols (2002, modified DD model hereinafter) as applied by 
Francis et al. (2005). 
I find that  firms affected by FIN 46 (i.e., firms either consolidating VIEs or 
terminating /restructuring VIEs), compared to firms reporting no material impact from 
FIN 46, experienced lower quality of accruals, measured by the accrual estimation errors 
from the modified DD model, the standard deviation of the residuals from the DD model, 
and modified DD model. In the additional analysis, I replaced the control sample with a 
matched pair sample. I find consistent results using the accrual quality measured by 
absolute accrual estimation errors and the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
modified DD model.  
 When it comes to the differences between the two subgroups in the FIN 46 firms 
(firms consolidating VIEs and firms terminating or restructuring VIEs), the results 
consistently show that the accrual quality of firms consolidating VIEs (group 1) are lower 
compared to that of firms in group 2, no matter which control sample is used. The 
differential change in accrual quality between the two groups can be partially attributed 
to the facts that group 1 has pressure to manage earnings when the consolidation brings 
4 
 
negative effects on earnings. This prediction is confirmed by the empirical tests using 
signed abnormal accrual measures. 
 The results of the first part of the dissertation help us understand the changes in 
accrual quality for firms impacted by FIN 46. Although the consolidation process and 
improved disclosure may constrain earnings management through previously used off-
balance sheet SPEs, firms may resort to other methods that bypass VIEs to manipulate 
earnings, thus worsening the accrual quality in the post-FIN 46 periods.  
 Findings in the first part of this dissertation contribute to the literature in the 
following ways. First, my study adds to the literature on the impact of FIN 46 on 
financial reporting. Prior studies investigate the economic consequences of FIN 46 from 
the perspective of market participants’ responsiveness such as cost of capital (Callahan et 
al. 2012), analyst forecast precision, and earnings response coefficients (Gurun et al. 
2012). While these studies largely assume that the implementation of FIN 46 enhances 
financial reporting transparency and deters earnings management, no extant research 
examines the impact of the changes in SPE consolidation rules on the quality of reported 
accounting numbers. This study fills this void by examining the effects of FIN 46 on 
accrual quality. Second, this study contributes to the stream of studies on off-balance 
sheet items in general. While prior studies provide evidence that firms with SPEs manage 
earnings through off-balance sheet activities, this study extends prior research by testing 
whether the changes in rules related to SPEs affect the quality of accruals. Third, this 
study contributes to the literature that examines how mandatory changes in accounting 
standards affect financial reporting quality.  
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 In the second part of the dissertation, I focus on the effects of FIN 46 on 
investment decisions made by affected firms. More specifically I examine the investment 
efficiency of affected firms during the pre- and post-FIN46 periods. This particular 
question is important for several reasons. First, the implementation of FIN 46 may have 
significant influence on financial reporting quality that includes quality of reported 
accounting numbers (i.e., accruals quality) and quality of disclosures. Second, FIN 46 is 
likely to reduce affected firms’ financial flexibility by eliminating the opportunity to use 
certain off-balance sheet items, thus creating financial constraints.  Prior studies show 
that investment efficiency is associated with quality of financial reporting as well as with 
financial constraints (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009). Thus, FIN 46 
provides a unique setting to test how the implementation of the accounting guide affects 
investment efficiency. 
   An important determinant of firms’ economic productivity and future 
performance is investment efficiency, which can be affected by accounting information 
quality. Poor accounting quality (such as the opaqueness of accounting information 
caused by the use of off-balance sheet items) exacerbates information asymmetry 
between firms and investors. Prior research suggests that information asymmetry can 
create either liquidity constraints or excess liquidity, both of which are associated with 
investment inefficiency (Biddle and Hilary 2006). While the implementation of FIN 46 
likely affects financial information quality, it may also impose indirect restrictions on 
certain off-balance sheet financing, which in turn affects real investment activities (Bens 
and Monahan 2008). Thus, this study addresses an empirically open question of whether 
FIN 46 improves investment efficiency.    
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 To examine the effects of FIN 46 on investment efficiency, I compare firms 
affected by FIN 46 before and after the implementation of this accounting 
pronouncement by using the same sample and classifications for tests and control groups 
as used in the first part of the dissertation.  More specifically, I compare investment 
efficiency of the consolidation group and the off-book group between pre-and post-
FIN46 periods, using no material impact group as the control. In addition, I use a 
matched-pair control sample to test the robustness of the results. I use two different sets 
of measures for investment efficiency that are applied in the literature. First, I use 
investment-cash flow sensitivity as a proxy for investment efficiency following Biddle 
and Hilary (2006). Although there are debates on the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
measure in the Finance literature (i.e.,Kaplan and Zingles 1997,  Fazzari et al. 2000, etc.), 
I use this measure to explain a different dimension of investment efficiency. Second, I 
use the absolute value of deviations from expected level of investment as a measure of 
investment efficiency. The expectation models from prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 
2011) are used to derive this measure.    
I find mixed results from using two different proxies for investment efficiency in 
this study. Using the investment-cash flow sensitivity measure to proxy for investment 
efficiency, where higher sensitivity implies lower efficiency, I find firms affected by FIN 
46 experienced decreased investment efficiency indicated by increased investment 
sensitivity to cash flows. The control sample in the tests consists of firms reporting no 
material impact from FIN 46.The same results are found using matched pairs as another 
control sample of FIN 46 firms. I also find the investment of firms consolidating VIEs is 
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more sensitive to cash flows after their adoption of FIN 46, compared to both the no-
impact firms and matched pairs.  
  I find contrasting results when I use the deviation from expected investment as a 
proxy for investment efficiency. When comparing FIN 46 firms and their matched pairs, I 
find that FIN 46 firms experience improved investment efficiency measured by the 
deviation from expected investment after their adoption of FIN 46. Furthermore, I find 
firms consolidating VIEs experience improved investment efficiency measured by the 
deviation from expected investment after FIN 46, compared to their matched peers. 
However, firms restructuring or terminating their VIEs do not exhibit such improvement. 
 The complete opposite results from using the two different proxies warrant further 
explanations. One possible explanation could be investment-cash flow sensitivity may be 
capturing different dimensions of investment decision compared to the deviation from 
expected investment. Another possible explanation could be the effects of the financial 
constraints faced by firms affected by FIN 46, because firms that are no longer allowed to 
use off-balance sheet financing may have less financing flexibility. To explore the 
possibility, I redo investment-cash flow sensitivity tests by splitting the test sample based 
on financial constraints and find evidence that the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is driven by financial constraints.      
 The second study in the dissertation contributes to the literature by extending a 
relatively small but growing stream of research on how the quality of accounting 
information affects investment efficiency. It also contributes to the literature on the 
economic consequences of FIN 46. 
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 I organize the remaining sections as follows. Chapter II provides the background 
of this study. I introduce the definitions of special purpose entities (SPEs) and variable 
interest entities (VIEs). I also provide the descriptions of FIN 46 and FIN 46 (R) with its 
application scope, important terms, and effective dates. 
 Chapter III is the first study of the dissertation, which examines the effects of FIN 
46 on accruals quality. I measure accruals quality using several extensively used proxies 
in the literature like Dechow and Dichev (2002), McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. 
(2005). I find that compared to firms reporting no material impact from FIN 46, firms 
impacted by FIN 46 experience worsened accruals quality after consolidating, 
terminating or restructuring VIEs. The accruals quality is measured by the accrual 
estimation errors in the modified DD 2002 model (ABS_MDD) and the standard deviation 
of the residuals in the DD 2002 model and its modified version (STD_DD and 
STD_MDD), Furthermore, among firms impacted by FIN 46, firms consolidating VIEs 
experience lower accrual quality proxied by these measures, compared to firms 
terminating or restructuring VIEs. 
 Chapter IV is the second study of my dissertation, which examines the effects of 
FIN 46 on investment efficiency. Measuring investment efficiency using the deviation 
from expected investment (Chen et al. 2011), the empirical results show that firms 
affected by FIN 46 experience improved investment efficiency after the adoption of FIN 
46, compared to a sample of matched firms that are not affected by FIN 46. Among these 
FIN 46 firms, firms consolidating VIEs experience greater improvement than those 
restructuring or terminating VIEs. However, when measuring investment using 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, I find opposite results. 
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Chapter V concludes this dissertation. In this chapter, I summarize the two studies 
in the dissertation, describe the contributions, and discuss potential limitations 
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND 
 In this chapter, I discuss the background of accounting guidance relating  to 
special purpose entities (SPEs) and variable interest entities (VIEs). I provide 
descriptions of FIN 46 and FIN 46 (R) with its application scope, important terms in the 
standard and its effective dates. 
Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) 
 SPEs are subsidiaries created for a limited purpose, with a limited life and limited 
activities, and designed to benefit their sponsoring companies. SPEs were best known for 
their use in leasing and asset securitization transactions (SEC, 2005). Although used in 
accounting practice in the early 1980s, SPEs received very limited attention from the 
academic and professional accounting literature until Enron’s scandal in 2001, which 
revealed many concerns related to SPEs (Hartgraves and Benston 2002). SPEs usually 
have the legal forms of partnership, trust, joint venture or corporation.  
 The main applications of SPEs in early years include off-balance sheet 
securitizations, long-term lease and research and development (R&D) funds. Generally, 
special purpose entities have the following characteristics: thinly capitalized; no 
independent management or employees; a trustee serving as the intermediate between the 
SPE and the sponsoring company by performing administrative functions (Soroosh and 
Giesielski 2004).   
 Before the implementation of FIN 46, U.S. GAAP requires the consolidation of 
SPEs based solely on voting rights. Specifically, the sponsor of SPEs does not need to 
consolidate if a third party residual equity investment at risk is at least three percent of 
the SPE’s total capital.  
11 
 
FIN 46 and FIN 46 (R)  
 In 2003, FASB issued interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest 
Entities—An Interpretation of ARB No. 51 (FIN 46), in January and revised it in 
December. The revised version is FIN 46 (R). FIN 46 “clarifies the application of 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, Consolidated Financial Statements, to certain 
entities in which equity investors do not have the characteristics of a controlling financial 
interest or do not have sufficient equity at risk for the entity to finance its activities 
without additional subordinated financial support” (FASB, 2003).   
 FIN 46 mandates consolidation by setting criteria on whether the sponsor is the 
primary beneficiary of the SPEs, instead of depending on the voting interest. Primary 
beneficiary is the party that absorbs the majority of the expected residual return or the 
expected losses of the SPE it sponsors.3  FIN 46 also increases the consolidation 
threshold of third party investments from three percent to ten percent. 
 The SPEs that are affected by FIN 46 are called Variable Interest Entities (VIEs), 
and should be consolidated by their primary beneficiaries. FIN 46 also mandates new 
disclosure requirements for sponsoring firms that have significant interests in VIEs 
(FASB, 2003).  
Variable Interest Entities (VIE) 
 FIN 46 defines “variable interest” as “contractual, ownership, or other pecuniary 
interests in an entity that change with changes in the fair value of the entity’s net assets 
                                                 
3 The absorption of expected losses is a more important condition than the absorption of expected return 
when evaluating whether a party is the primary beneficiary. In the cases when one party absorb the 
majority of the expected return of a VIE, while another party absorb the majority of the expected losses, the 
lesser should be considered the primary beneficiary of the VIE and thus should consolidate the VIE (FASB, 
2003). 
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exclusive of variable interests” (FASB, 2003). This includes “equity interests, debt 
obligations, leases, royalties or other contracts, and monetary interests in an entity that 
changes as the entity’s net assets value fluctuates” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). 
Variable interest entities are the SPEs that are subject to FIN 46 and need to be 
consolidated by their primary beneficiaries.  
Effective Dates 
 FIN 46 (R) are applied to SPEs no later than as of the end of the first reporting 
period that ends after December 15, 2013 (as of December 31, 2013 for firms with 
calendar-year reporting periods) for public companies (FASB, 2003). For nonpublic 
companies, FIN 46 (R) is applied to all the entities subject to this interpretation by the 
beginning of the first annual period beginning after December 15, 2004 (FASB, 2003).  
 In practice, some firms chose to early adopt FIN 46 when it was first issued in 
January 2003 (before the revision in December, 2013). 
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CHAPTER III: IMPLICATIONS OF FIN 46 FOR ACCRUALS QUALITY 
MOTIVATION 
 This study investigates whether the implementation of this new guidance affects 
accrual quality of firms impacted by FIN 46. By using SPEs, firms gain more flexibility 
to manage reported earnings and debts since sponsoring firms control both entities. Prior 
studies provide evidence that firms manage earnings by using off-balance sheet items 
(e.g., Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Feng et al. 2009; Dechow et al. 2010). Dechow and 
Shakespeare (2009) find that firms manage earnings by timing securitizations of assets by 
using SPEs. Feng et al. (2009) document that SPEs created for financial reporting 
purpose are more likely to manage earnings. Their tests all focus on the pre-FIN 46 
periods. Since FIN 46 mandates new consolidation rules and disclosure provisions for 
firms with SPEs, resultant enhanced transparency is expected to decrease opportunistic 
earnings management (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Hunton et al. 2006), thus improve the 
accrual quality. However, the accrual quality of firms impacted by FIN 46 may 
deteriorate. Previous studies show that when one method of earnings management 
becomes costly, firms will resort to alternative ways to manage earnings (e.g., Zhang, 
2012; Chi et al. 2011). When VIEs are consolidated, firms may resort to other methods 
that bypass the VIEs to manipulate earnings to window-dress the accounting numbers on 
the consolidated financial statements. Therefore, it is worthwhile to disentangle how the 
accrual quality changes for firms impacted by FIN 46. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and Earnings Management 
14 
 
 SPEs that are kept off the financial statements can be used not only to hide debt, 
but also to manage earnings (SEC, 2005). Feng et al. (2009) identify the determinants of 
using SPEs in a large cross-temporal sample. SPEs can be set up for financial reporting, 
economic and tax purposes. They also find that SPEs arranged for financial reporting 
purposes are associated with earnings management. While their sample period ranges 
from 1997 to 2004, they do not examine whether the use of SPEs to manage earnings 
changes after the implementation of FIN 46. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) investigate 
earnings management behavior by focusing on a particular group of SPEs that are used 
for asset securitizations. They document that a significantly higher volume of 
securitization transactions occur in the last few days of the quarter during the first three 
quarters taking advantage of relax disclosure requirements for the quarterly financial 
reporting. They find these transactions are associated with incentives for earnings 
management. Dechow et al. (2010) also provide evidence consistent with firms with 
SPEs managing earnings by using flexibility available in accounting rules.  
Impact of FIN 46 
 Callahan, Smith and Spencer (2012) find that firms with VIEs affected by FIN 46 
experience increases in the cost of equity capital compared to firms reporting no material 
impact from the standard. They also find that firms consolidating VIEs experience larger 
increases in cost of capital compared to those keeping VIEs off the financial statements 
through restructuring or termination.  
Callahan and Spencer (2012) focus on firms that are not the primary beneficiary 
but hold a significant variable interest in a variable interest entity (VIE) to examine the 
value relevance of the disclosure made under FIN 46 of these firms. FIN 46 requires such 
15 
 
firms to make additional disclosures about the off-balance sheet VIEs like firm’s 
maximum amount at risk, even though they don’t need to consolidate the VIEs. They find 
the maximum risk disclosures were only marginally priced. They also examine the 
differential impact of off-balance sheet disclosure required by FIN 46 and the 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure required by SOX. They find 
additional improvement in firm idiosyncratic risk for firms disclosing interests in VIEs 
under FIN 46. Dickinson et al. (2010) examine the market reaction of FIN 46 and find 
that from investors’ perspective, the cost of complying with FIN 46 significantly 
outweighs the intended improvements in the accounting information quality. However, 
investors think that the information quality is improved for highly levered firms. Gurun et 
al. (2012) find that firms affected by FIN 46 are perceived by the market as having higher 
information risk. However, there is no such reaction for information users who have 
access to off-balance sheet debt structure information prior to 2001. Luo and Warfield 
(2014) examined the impact of FIN 46 on firms’ earnings informativeness. They partition 
firms into two groups based on their likelihood to manipulate earnings before FIN 46. For 
firms that manipulated earnings less using SPEs before FIN 46, the perceived earnings 
informativeness measured by earnings response coefficient (ERC), while no such 
improvement is found for other firms. They also find that firms restructuring VIEs 
experience differential market reaction compared to other VIE firms. Bonsall and 
Bozanic (2012) find that consolidated VIEs are associated with less information 
asymmetry than unconsolidated VIEs, suggesting that there are potential hidden risks of 
the unconsolidated VIEs. The information asymmetry is reduced after consolidating VIEs 
through the adoption of FIN 46. 
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 Zhang (2009) examine the economic consequences of FIN 46. She finds that 
credit ratings for VIEs worsened after FIN 46 and that the pricing of information risk 
decreased for non-VIE firms, but not for VIE firms.  
 There are some prior studies that focus on certain categories of off-balance sheet 
items impacted by FIN 46. Synthetic leases are a common off-balance sheet item since 
they were qualified as operating lease before FIN 46. According to FIN 46, lessee 
companies should consolidate synthetic leases if they are held by SPEs classified as VIEs 
under the terms of FIN 46 (Danvers et al. 2003). Callahan, Smith and Spencer (2013) 
focus on firms with synthetic leases impacted by FIN 46 to examine the change in market 
valuation and related measurement reliability of these firms after FIN 46. They find that 
the synthetic lease liabilities recognized in the financial statements, as required by FIN 
46, are valued with greater weight by the market than are those disclosed in the notes 
before FIN 46. This differential valuation effect is associated with the perceived 
measurement reliability across the adoption of FIN 46.  
 Another common form of off-balance sheet SPEs are asset-backed commercial 
papers (ABCPs). They are backed by receivables of companies and then issued by banks 
to investors as a short-term investment vehicle. The financial statements of ABCPs were 
not reported by the sponsors before FIN 46. According to the FIN 46 definitions, many of 
the ABCPs are VIEs and their sponsors become the primary beneficiary, which are 
required to consolidate ABCPs on the financial statements. Bens and Monahan (2008) 
find that the use of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) declined after FIN 46 and the 
decline is caused by the decrease in the ABCP sponsors. Banks in North America 
engaged in restructuring to avoid consolidating ABCPs on the financial statements. 
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Accrual Quality   
 One of the most widely used accrual quality metrics is proposed by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002), who suggested measuring accrual quality as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on past, present, 
and future operating cash flows. This measure is adjusted by McNichols (2002) and 
Francis et al. (2005) to include current year change in sales and current year property 
plant and equipment so that it is linked with the discretionary accruals model derived by 
Jones (1991). Accrual quality carries the information about the mapping of earnings and 
cash flows. The poorer the accrual quality is, the more information risk exists in the 
accounting information (Francis et al. 2005). This measure has been extensively used in 
accrual quality literature (e.g., Barua et al. 2010).   
 Prior studies also use other metrics to evaluate the quality of accruals. For 
example, the abnormal total accruals estimated using the modified Jones model (Dechow 
et al. 1995); performance-matched abnormal accruals (Francis et al. 2005). In this paper, 
I use all of these metrics to measure accrual quality to test the impact of FIN 46 on the 
accrual quality for firms adopted the standard. 
 Prior studies find that accrual quality is related to cost of equity. Francis et al. 
(2004) find that firms with the least favorable earnings attributes experience a higher cost 
of equity than firms with the most favorable earnings attributes. Among the seven 
attributes they examined, accrual quality is associated with the largest cost of equity 
effects.  Francis et al. (2005) examine the market pricing of accrual quality and find that 
less favorable accrual quality is associated with higher cost of debt and equity, suggesting 
accrual quality captures the information risk perceived by investors.  
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Although SPEs are used by sponsoring firms predominantly to keep assets and 
obligations off-balance sheet for arranging external financing, they also provide 
managers with potential earnings management opportunities. For example, managers 
opportunistically time the recognition of gains on securitizations and use their discretion 
in the process of estimating gains or losses. Firms using SPEs to frame lease transactions 
can exercise discretion on fixing selling prices of assets, timing of asset transferring, 
recognition of depreciation and impairments etc. Similarly firms with research & 
development partnership can manage reported R&D expenses. 
 Feng et al. (2009) use a relatively bigger sample and provide evidence that SPEs 
arranged for financial reporting purposes are associated with earnings management. Their 
data period is from 1997 to 2004 and they didn’t examine whether the use of 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings changes for VIE firms after FIN 46.  Dechow 
and Shakespeare (2009) investigate whether firms manage earnings by using gain on 
securitizations of assets by using SPEs. They document that a significantly higher volume 
of securitization transactions occur in the last few days of the quarter during the first 
three quarters taking advantage of relax disclosure requirements for the quarterly 
financial reporting. They find these transactions are associated with incentives for 
earnings management. Dechow et al. (2010) also provide evidence consistent with firms 
with SPEs manage earnings by using flexibility available in accounting rules. 
 Firms with VIEs subject to FIN 46 respond to the standard by consolidating VIEs 
on the financial statements, or restructuring VIEs to avoid consolidation or terminating 
VIEs. In each case, the earnings management using VIEs can be mitigated. Besides, 
19 
 
increased disclosure improves accounting transparency and reduces information 
asymmetry, firms tend to engage in less earnings management and thus improve quality 
of accruals (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). However, the provision of FIN 46 can also be 
associated with more earnings management. The consolidation rules of VIEs result in not 
only increases in both assets and liabilities of the sponsoring firms, but also increases in 
the depreciation expenses of the fixed assets and interest expenses of the debts, which 
were previously kept away from the income statement. Thus consolidation of SPEs may 
lead to a decrease in net income. Due to the decrease in the accounting rate of returns, 
managers may have incentives to manage earnings upward. 
 Since the off-balance sheet SPEs were used to manage earnings, consolidating 
them on the financial statements or terminating them make firms lose such channels to 
manipulate earnings, thus the earnings may be manipulated in other ways that cannot be 
kept off the books any more. On the other hand, earnings management can be achieved 
using different methods including manipulating accruals or real activities, and there is a 
trade-off between these two methods, that is, if the costs of one method increase, firms 
may switch to another method to manage earnings (Zhang, 2012). If SPEs are used more 
for real-activity earnings management, firms consolidating or terminating previously off-
book SPEs will lose the shelter for such earnings management, they may resort to more 
accrual-based earnings management.  
 Considering the discussion above on the possibility of decreasing or increasing 
earnings management, I expect FIN 46 may affect either direction of the change in 
accrual quality. More formally, my hypothesis is as follows: 
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H1:  Firms with VIEs experience a change in accrual quality after FIN 46    
  compared to firms reporting no material impact by the standard. 
 Among the firms with VIEs under FIN 46, some respond to the standard by 
consolidating their VIEs on the financial statements, while some respond by restructuring 
or disposing of the VIEs so that they can keep the VIEs off books. Callahan et al. (2012) 
find that firms consolidating VIEs experience a differential effect on cost of capital 
compared to those that restructure or divest VIEs. It is worthwhile to examine whether 
there are differential effects of FIN 46 on the accrual quality between the two groups.  
 Firms consolidating VIEs on their financial statements provide more detailed 
accounting information about the VIEs to the public than those keeping VIEs off the 
books. Feng et al. (2009) find that the use of SPEs is associated with earnings 
management using discretionary accruals. Consolidating VIEs that were previously kept 
off the balance sheet is expected to decrease the opportunities of accrual-based earnings 
management for the sponsoring firms. 
 Compared to the consolidating firms, firms keeping the VIEs off the books still 
have opportunities to manipulate earnings through VIEs. These firms normally incur 
restructuring charges that represent continuing costs since they need to provide 
continuous services for the third party to which the VIEs are shifted to (Bens and 
Monahan 2008), such ongoing costs may make firms have incentives to smooth earnings 
after FIN 46.  
 Therefore, different responses after the adoption of FIN 46 between the two 
groups may have different impacts on their accrual quality. My second hypothesis is: 
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H2:  Firms consolidating VIEs experience a differential change in accrual quality    
         compared to firms keeping VIEs off books by restructuring or terminating. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Accrual Quality Measures 
 I use several different accrual quality measures used in prior studies to conduct 
my empirical analyses.   
 My first accrual quality measure is the absolute value of performance-matched 
abnormal accruals as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) based on the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995). 
 ܶܣ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵሺ1/ܣ௧ିଵሻ+	ߙଶሺ߂ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ߂ܴܧܥ௧ሻ ൅ ܲܲܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                           (1)                         
Where: 
												ܶܣ௧ = total accruals in year t, measured as the difference between income before     
           extraordinary items and operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets;  
													ܣ௧ିଵ = total assets in year t-1; 
      						߂ܴܧܥ௧ = current year change in receivables scaled by lagged total assets; 
߂ܴܧ ௧ܸ = current year change in sales scaled by lagged total assets; 
 ܲܲܧ௧ = current year level of property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged  
          total assets.  
I estimate equation (1) by industry-year. The residual from equation (1) is the abnormal 
total accruals. Then I adjust the abnormal total accruals using the performance match 
method used in Francis et al. (2005). First, I form the ROA deciles (performance deciles) 
for each industry and year, then calculate median abnormal total accruals for each decile. 
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The difference between abnormal total accruals and the median abnormal total accruals is 
the performance-matched abnormal total accruals. I use the absolute value of the 
performance matched abnormal total accruals (ABS_PMAA) as my first measure of 
accrual quality.  
 I also estimate the abnormal working capital accruals and use the absolute value 
of the performance matched abnormal working capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA) as my 
second measure of accrual quality.  
															ܹܥ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵሺ1/ܣ௧ିଵሻ+	ߙଶሺ߂ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ߂ܴܧܥ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௧                                     (2)              
Where: 
 ܹܥ௧ = working capital accruals, calculated as total accruals plus depreciation and  
  amortization. 
 Other variables have been defined above. The residuals in equation (2) are the 
abnormal working capital accruals. I get the performance-matched abnormal working 
capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA) following similar process as that of total accruals 
described before. 
 The next two sets of accrual quality measures are based on the accruals estimation 
error model developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002, DD Model hereinafter).  Accruals 
estimation errors are derived from the following model that specifies working capital 
accruals as a function of previous, current and future period operating cash flow 
realizations.  
∆ܹܥ௧ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܥܨܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܥܨܱ௧ ൅ ߙଷܥܨܱ௧ାଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                      (3)                         
Where: 
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            ∆ܹܥ௧	= change in working capital, calculated as: change in accounts payable +  
          change in inventory- change in taxes payable + change in other assets    
           (net); 
              CFO = cash flow from operations; 
Following McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), I also include the current year 
change in sales (ΔREV) and the current year level of property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
as additional controls variables in Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s model (Modified DD 
Model hereinafter).  
∆ܹܥ௧ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܥܨܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܥܨܱ௧ ൅ ߙଷܥܨܱ௧ାଵ ൅ ߂ܴܧ ௧ܸ ൅ ܲܲܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧        (4)              
 Following Francis et al. (2005), I estimate both equation (3) and equation (4) 
cross-sectionally by year and by the two-digic SIC code. The absolute value of firm-
specific residuals ε୲ in equation (3) denoted as ABS_DD and in equation (4) as 
ABS_MDD, which are the third and fourth measures for accrual quality used in this study.  
  My third set of accruals quality measures are based on the standard deviation of 
firm-and year-specific accrual estimation errors derived from equations (3) and (4). 
Smaller (larger) standard deviations of accrual estimation errors are relatively better 
(poorer) quality of accruals. I derive accruals quality measures by calculating standard 
deviations of firm-and year-specific residuals during the four years before and after the 
implementation of FIN 46. The fifth and sixth measures are respectively based on 
original model in equation (3) denoted as STD_DD and on the modified model in 
equation (4) denoted as STD_MDD. 
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Empirical Models for Hypotheses Testing  
 To test H1, I use a sample including both FIN 46 firms (firms affected by FIN 46) 
and No-Impact firms (firms reporting no material impact from the standard). I use 
following model that specifies accruals quality (AQ) as a function of fundamental firm 
characteristics along with indicator variables for firms affected by FIN 46 and for the 
year of implementation of FIN 46, and interactions between them:                                                
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ൅ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅
														ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅
														ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                           (5)                             
Where:    
AQt = six accrual quality measures as described above; 
FIN46 = 1 for firms affected by FIN 46, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGEt = book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets; 
GROWTHt = change in sales from year t-1 to year t scaled by beginning 
total assets; 
ROAt = return on assets;                                            
LOG_CYCLEt = logarithm of the length of operating cycle; 
OCFt = operating cash flow scaled by beginning total assets. 
OCF2t=the square of OCF. 
POST=indicator variable for the post-adoption period of FIN 46                                       
The variable of interest is the interaction variable	ܱܲܵܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46. The coefficient for the 
interaction term (βଷሻ	indicates whether the accrual quality changed for firms affected by 
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FIN 46 during the post implementation period relative to firms reporting no material 
impact from the standard. A significant positive (negative) coefficient suggests that firms 
affected by FIN 46 are associated with poorer (better) quality of accruals during the post-
implementation period compared firms not affected by FIN 46.    
 To test H2, I divide FIN 46 firms into two groups: firms consolidating VIEs 
(FIN46_CON) and firms keeping VIEs off the books (FIN46_OFF) following the 
approach used in Callahan et al. (2012), and test the change in accrual quality between 
these two groups. The sample includes all the three groups of firms.  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߜଵܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߜଶܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߜଷܱܲܵܶ ൈ
ܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ 	ߜସܱܲܵܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅
	ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ε୲               (6)                           
The variable of interest is POST*FIN46_CONt ,  ߜ3  indicates the direction and 
magnitude of effects on accrual quality for firms consolidating VIEs relative to firms 
keeping VIEs off books during the post FIN 46 period.               
 For the tests of ABS_DD, ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD, OCF and OCF2 
are not used as control variables since these measures are estimated from the regressions 
of working capital on cash flows.  
DATA AND SAMPLE 
 Empirical analyses in this study are mainly conducted on a sample formed by 
manually identifying firms that are affected by FIN 46 and that disclose no material 
impact from FIN 46 in 10-K or 10-Q filings. To identify those firms I follow the 
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approach used by Callahan et al. (2012). To test hypotheses I form three groups with 
sample firms depending on the effects of FIN 46 on those firms.   
Group 1: Consolidation Group (On-Book Group) 
 I used 10-K wizard to identify a sample of firms that consolidated their variable 
interest entities (VIEs) in 2003 by searching 10-K and 10-Q forms reported in 2004. To 
ensure the accuracy of the search, I used different combinations of keywords that 
including the actual action of “consolidation” by the adoption of FIN 46, instead of the 
wording only describing the standard, like “have consolidated”, “has consolidated”, “we 
consolidated”.4 Some firms used passive voice, so I also used “was consolidated” and 
“were consolidated”.  In addition, some firms use “the company” to describe themselves 
so I also searched by “the company consolidated”5.  These searching process identify 260 
unique firms. 
Group 2: Off-Book Group 
 I identify a sample of firms that keep their VIEs off the books. Some firms with 
VIEs try to avoid consolidation by terminating, restructuring, divesting or disposing the 
VIEs, therefore I searched 10-K and 10-Q forms using these four keywords combined 
with FIN 46. 113 unique firms are found through this searching method. 
                                                 
4 If only searching by ‘FIN 46”and  “consolidated”, the results will include any companies that describe the 
standard, for example: “FIN 46 requires a variable interest entity to be consolidated by a company”, not the 
companies that actually did the consolidation.  
 
5 This keyword will also return results including “the company’s consolidated”, like “the company’s 
consolidated financial statements”. Therefore, I refined the keywords as “(FIN p/3 46 p/50 the company 
consolidated) AND NOT (FIN p/3 46 p/50 the company's consolidated)”, then the results will exclude 
those searched by the latter group of key words.  
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 Feng et al. (2009) search likely VIEs in firms’ exhibit 21 and consider entities 
with the forms ‘‘Limited Partnership,’’ ‘‘L.P.,’’ ‘‘LP,’’ ‘‘LLC,’’ ‘‘L.L.C.,’’ or ‘‘trust”.  
As they stated, this selection process will possibly exclude SPEs that don’t have these 
organization forms or include SPEs that have been already consolidated in the financial 
statement. Since my research question focus on the impact of FIN 46, I find firms 
consolidating, terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 1 and group 2) by directly 
searching the words “VIE”, “consolidated”, “terminated”, “restructured” in 10 forms. To 
ensure the accuracy of the test sample, I read each 10-K form to find the description of 
such actions.  
Group 3: No Impact Group 
 I find 1077 unique firms reporting “no impact” or “no material impact” from FIN 
46 by searching in 10-K forms.6  
Sample Derivation 
 Table 1 Panel A provides the sample derivation for empirical analyses of 
abnormal accrual measures: abnormal total accruals (AA), working capital accrual 
(AWCA), performance-matched abnormal total accrual (PM_AA) and working capital 
accruals (PM_AWCA). Searching using 10-K wizard, 260 firms consolidated VIEs 
through the adoption of FIN 46 (group 1). The sample is narrowed down to 184 firms 
after excluding firms with missing observations to estimate abnormal accruals. After 
deleting firms in financial industries (SIC 6000-6999), 144 firms are left. There are 2580 
firm-year observations from 1988 – 2012 for group 1. Since my testing period is 1998 – 
2007, the final sample for group 1 includes 1225 firm-year observations.  
                                                 
6 I excluded those firms overlapping with group 1 and group 2 from the initial searching results.  
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 Following the same sample deviation process, Group 2 and Group 3 have 592 and 
5690 firm-year observations respectively from 1998 – 2007.  
 Table 1 Panel B provides the sample derivation for the tests on accrual quality 
measured using the accrual estimation errors from the DD model. Using the similar 
filtering process, Group 1, 2, 3 have 509, 159 and 2690 firm-year observations 
respectively from 1998 – 2007. The pre-FIN 46 periods are defined as 1998-2001, the 
post-FIN 46 periods are defined as 2004-2007. The transition periods 2002-2003 are 
excluded from the analyses because accounting adjustments during this transition period 
may artificially affect the results.7 8 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the (performance-matched) 
abnormal total accruals, (performance-matched) working capital accruals and the control 
variables for the three groups of firms from 1998 - 2007. The mean absolute values of 
abnormal total accruals (ABS_AA) are 0.060 for firms consolidating VIEs (group 1), 
0.060 for firms terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 2) and 0.116 for firms reporting 
no material impact from FIN 46 (group 3). The mean absolute value of abnormal working 
capital accruals (ABS_AWCA) are 0.057, 0.051 and 0.107 respectively for the three 
groups. The absolute values of performance-matched abnormal total accruals 
(ABS_PMAA) are 0.072, 0.069 and 0.121 respectively for the three groups. The absolute 
                                                 
7 Initial development of FIN 46 started in early 2002 and adoption of the pronouncement could take several 
months over 2003. I expect full implementation of the pronouncement was completed by 2004 and 
financial statement for fiscal year 2004 onward would reflect the effect of FIN 46.  
 
8   In the regression analysis, I also require that same firms must be both in the pre- and post- FIN 46 periods. 
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values of performance-matched working capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA) are 0.062, 
0.055 and 0.109 respectively for the three groups.  
 The mean SIZE of group 1 and group 2 are 7.693 and 7.858 respectively, while 
the mean size of group 3 is 5.173. This is consistent with the fact that firms with SPEs 
(VIEs) are usually larger firms since they have better technical expertise to handle the 
complex financing arrangement (SEC 2005; Feng 2009). The mean LEVERAGE is 0.628 
for group 1, 0.632 for group2, and 0.568 for group 3. This indicates that firms with SPEs 
(VIEs) usually have higher leverage than other firms. The mean ROA of group 3 is -
0.111, which is lower than group 1 (mean ROA=0.005) and group 2 (mean ROA=0.014). 
 Table 2 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the accrual estimation errors 
from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, the standard deviation for the accrual estimation 
errors developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002), and the control variables in the 
regression models. The mean absolute values of the accrual estimation errors (ABS_DD) 
are 0.043 for group 1, 0.037 for group 2 and 0.066 for group 3. ABS_MDD is the mean 
absolute value of the accrual estimation errors from the modified Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model in McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). The mean ABS_MDD is 
0.034 for group 1, 0.031 for group 2 and 0.058 for group 3. STD_DD is the standard 
deviation of the accrual estimation errors, which is the accrual quality measure in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002). STD_DD is 0.046 for group 1, 0.043 for group 2 and 0.078 
for group 3. There is less variation in accrual estimation errors for firms with SPEs than 
those without SPEs. STD_MDD is the accrual quality measure used in McNichols (2002) 
and Francis et al. (2005). Group 1 has mean STD_MDD at 0.032, while group 2 has 0.037 
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and group 3 has 0.065. The descriptive statistics of the control variables are similar to 
those in Table 1 Panel A.  
Multiple Regression Analyses 
Accruals Quality: Firms affected by FIN 46 versus No Impact Firms 
 To test hypothesis 1 (H1) I estimate equation (3) by using three sets of proxies for 
accruals quality as dependent variables: (a) absolute value of performance matched 
abnormal total accruals— ABS_PMAA, and performance matched abnormal working 
capital accruals— ABS_PMAWCA, (b) absolute value of accruals estimations errors using 
the DD model— ABS_DD and absolute value of accruals estimations errors from the 
Modified DD model — ABS_MDD, and (c) accruals quality measures using the DD 
model and Modified DD Model.   
Absolute Value Performance-Matched Abnormal Accruals 
 Table 3 provides the regression results of equation (3) using the performance-
matched abnormal total accruals (ABS_PMAA) and the performance-matched abnormal 
working capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA). All three groups of firms in the sample are 
used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of observations in Groups 1 
and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3. For both measures, the 
coefficients of the variable of interest POST*FIN46 are not significant.9 
 The coefficients for the control variables are consistent with prior studies. The 
coefficient of LEVERAGE is positive and significant (p<0.0001), indicating that firms 
with high leverage are more likely to have higher abnormal accruals. The coefficient for 
                                                 
9 I also use the non-performance matched measure, absolute value of abnormal total accruals (ABS_AA) and 
absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (ABS_AWCA), for additional tests, the results are not 
significant either.  
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SGROWTH is positive and significant (p<0.0001) since sales growth is associated with 
higher abnormal accruals. The coefficient for SIZE is negative and significant (p<0.0001) 
since larger firms tend to have lower abnormal accruals. LOG_CYCLE is positively 
associated with abnormal accruals, suggesting firms with longer operating cycle have 
higher abnormal accruals. The adjusted R2 is 27.50% for the ABS_PMAA test and 29.28% 
for the ABS_PMAWCA test. The adjusted R2 is higher for the ABS_PMAWCA regression. 
Prior research argues that firms have more discretion on managing working capital 
accruals compared to long term accruals.  
Absolute Value of Accrual Estimation Errors 
 I then estimate equation (3) by using absolute values of accruals estimation errors 
(ABS_DD and ABS_MDD respectively) from the DD model and the Modified DD model.  
Results are presented in Table 4. Adjusted R2 for ABS_DD and ABS_MDD are 18 percent 
and 22 percent, respectively. Coefficients of all control variables are consistent with those 
reported in previous table with abnormal accruals measures.  ROA is negatively 
associated with ABS_DD and ABS_MDD, consistent with firms with better performance 
have higher accrual quality. The correlation is negative since the accrual quality is taken 
the absolute value, and lower value of the dependent variable indicates higher accrual 
quality. The coefficients of the variable of interest POST*FIN46 are not significant for 
ABS_DD but positive and significant for ABS_MDD (p=0.032), suggesting that firms 
impacted by FIN 46 are likely to experience lower level of accruals quality measured by 
ABS_MDD compared to firms reporting no impact from the standard during the post 
implementation periods.  
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Standard Deviation of Accruals Estimation Errors 
 I then use a third set of proxies for accruals quality, which are measured as the 
standard deviation of firm-specific accruals estimation errors (STD_DD and STD_MDD 
respectively) from the DD model and Modified DD model. Standard deviations are 
estimated by using firm specific accrual estimation errors from cross sectional 
regressions during four years pre-and post-FIN46 periods. Results are presented in Table 
5.  
 The adjusted R2 is 22.23% for the regression with STD_DD and 24.92% for 
STD_MDD as the dependent variable. An increase in adjusted R-square for the measure 
from the augmented model is consistent with the assertion made by Francis et al. (2005) 
that the modified model lead to “a better –specified stream of residuals”. Control 
variables are consistent with prior studies. Sales growth and operating cycle are 
positively associated with the accruals quality suggesting that the higher the sales growth 
or the larger the operating cycle, it is more difficult to estimate accruals. On the other 
hand, the coefficients of size are significantly negative suggesting that larger firms have 
more stable operations and less difficult to estimate accruals. The variable of interest 
POST*FIN46 are consistently significant in both estimations (p=0.035, p=0.075 
respectively). These findings are consistent with results with absolute value of accruals 
estimation errors (ABS_MDD) reported in the previous table. 
 Overall, by using three different set of proxies for accruals quality I find mixed 
results. For accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD, the 
results are significant and consistent, suggesting that firms affected by FIN 46 are more 
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likely to experience poorer accruals quality during the post-implementation period 
compared to firms that disclose no material impact by FIN 46.  
Accruals Quality: Firms Consolidated versus Restructured or Terminated  
 The second hypothesis predicts differential effects of FIN 46 on accruals quality 
for firms consolidating their VIEs on the book (group1) versus firms either restructure 
VIEs to keep them off the book or terminate VIEs (group 2). Similar to the analyses 
reported for hypothesis 1, I conduct three sets of analyses by using absolute value of 
abnormal accruals and accruals estimation errors and standard deviation of accrual 
estimation errors as the dependent variables in equation (6) 
Absolute Value Performance-Matched Abnormal Accruals 
 Table 6 provides the regression results of equation (6) using the absolute value 
performance-matched abnormal total accruals (ABS_PMAA) and the performance-
matched abnormal working capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA). All three groups of firms 
in the sample are used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of 
observations in Groups 1 and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3.  The 
variable of interests are interaction terms POST*FIN46_CON and POST*FIN46_OFF, 
which reflect differential effects of FIN 46 implementation conditional upon whether the 
affected firm has consolidated VIEs with their financial statements, or restructured or 
terminated VIE to avoid consolidation.  
 Coefficients of all control variables are consistent with that reported in table 3. 
The variable of interests, both interaction terms POST*FIN46_CON and 
POST*FIN46_OFF, are not significant. 
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Accruals Estimation Errors 
I then use two sets of accruals quality metrics based on accruals estimation errors. 
The first set is absolute values of accrual estimation errors from the DD model and 
Modified DD model and the second set is standard deviations of accrual estimation 
errors. Table 7 provides the regression results using absolute values of accrual estimation 
errors.  Consistent with absolute value of accruals results, the variable of interests are the 
interaction terms POST*FIN46_CON and POST*FIN46_OFF. For the ABS_MDD test, 
the coefficient of POST*FIN46_CON is positive and significant while the coefficient of 
POST*FIN46_OFF is not significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
consolidating VIEs experience decrease in accrual quality (measured by ABS_MDD) 
compared to firms avoiding consolidation. All other control variables are consistent with 
previous analyses. 
Table 8 reports regression results of equation (6) where dependent variables are 
standard deviation of accrual estimation errors. Coefficients of POST*FIN46_CON are 
positive and significant in both regressions (p=0.026 and p=0.051 respectively). The 
other interaction term is not significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
consolidating VIEs experience decrease in accrual quality (measured by STD_DD and 
STD_MDD) compared to firms avoiding consolidation.   
Analyses with Matched Pair Control Groups   
FIN 46 Firms (Group 1&2) vs. Matched Pairs 
 In the previous sections, all empirical analyses use Group 3 as the control group 
that comprises firms disclosing no material impact from FIN 46. Table 2 shows 
observations in this group are significantly smaller and poor performers compared to 
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firms in Group 1 and 2. So I control for firms characteristics in all my preceding 
multivariate regressions. In this section, I provide complementary analyses by using a 
matched-pair sample as control group. I form this control sample by selecting matched 
observation for each FIN 46 firm-year observation. Specifically, for each firm-year 
observation in the test sample, I chose a matched pair from all the firms not affected by 
FIN 46, in the same year and same industry, requiring the closest ROA by restricting size 
difference less than 1.10 
 Table 9 panel A provides the univariate test for the difference between the accrual 
quality measures in the pre- and post- FIN 46 periods for the FIN 46 firms and the 
matched pairs. For ABS_DD, FIN 46 firms experience no significant change while the 
matched pairs experience significant decrease. There are same changes with regard to 
ABS_MDD. For STD_DD, there is no significant change between the pre- and post- FIN 
46 periods for both groups. For STD_MDD, FIN 46 firms experience significant increase 
while the matched pairs experience no significant change. For ABS_AA, ABS_AWCA, 
ABS_PMAA and ABS_PMAWCA, the change between the pre- and post- FIN 46 periods 
is similar for both groups.  
 The regression results are shown in Table 9 panel B. By using the matched pairs 
as the new control group, only ABS_MDD and STD_MDD are significant different 
between the test and control sample. The coefficient of POST*FIN46 are positive and 
significant for both measures (p=0.015 and 0.029 respectively). This is consistent as the 
results in Table 4 and table 5. The significant differences in ABS_MDD and STD_MDD 
                                                 
10 The duplicate matches are deleted. 
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between the test and different control samples shed some light to explain the accrual 
quality changes for the FIN 46 firms.  
Group 1 vs. Matched Pairs and Group 2 vs. Matched Pairs 
 To see the differences between the changes in accrual quality for firms 
consolidating VIEs (group 1) and firms terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 2), I 
selected a matched pair for group 1 and group 2 respectively. There is no significant 
difference between group 2 and its matched pairs after FIN 46 (untabulated). However, 
the accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD for group 1 is decreased after 
the implementation of FIN 46 compared to the matched pairs, as shown in Table 10. The 
coefficients of POST*FIN46 are positive and significant (p=0.010 and 0.027 
respectively). This indicate that firms consolidating VIEs experiences worse accrual 
quality measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD compared to the matched pairs.  
Group 1 vs. Group 2 
 When using group 1 as the test sample and group 2 as the control sample, I find 
the accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD for group 1 
decreases in the post-FIN 46 periods compared to group 2 (shown in Table 11), 
suggesting that the consolidation process affects accrual quality more than the 
termination or restructuring. The results are consistent with those in Table 7 and Table 8, 
and provide further evidence suggesting that group 1 experiences decrease in accruals 
quality measured by ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD compared to group 2.  
Analyses with Signed Abnormal Accrual Measures 
 Although the decrease in accrual quality cannot be totally attributed to accrual-
based earnings management (Dechow and Dichev 2002), it is worthwhile to examine 
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whether the accruals management can explain the decrease in accrual quality in this 
study. I conduct tests for H1 and H2 using signed abnormal accrual measures and find no 
significant change for FIN 46 firms overall. However, among the FIN 46 firms, I find that 
firms consolidating VIEs (group 1) experience increase in all the four abnormal accrual 
measures (AA, AWCA, PMAA, PMAWCA) in the post-FIN 46 period compared to firms 
restructuring or terminating VIEs (group 2). As shown in Table 12 and Table 13, the 
coefficients of POST*FIN46_CON are positive and significant for all the four measures. 
This provides partial explanation for the results for H2. Firms consolidating VIEs 
experiences bigger loss after the consolidation, they may have more pressure and 
incentive to conduct income-increasing earnings management using accruals.  
Robustness Tests 
 I also do the tests by excluding 2004 as transitory period and the results still hold. 
To be consistent with some previous studies, I also control for OCF and OCF2 for the 
ABS_DD, ABS_MDD, STD_DD, STD_MDD tests, the results are consistent 
(untabulated).  
SUMMARY 
 This study examines how the accruals quality for firms affected by FIN 46 
changes in the post-implementation periods. I compare accruals quality of firms affected 
by FIN 46 before and after the implementation of this accounting pronouncement by 
using a number of proxies for accruals quality. I find that compared to firms reporting no 
material impact from FIN 46, firms adopting the new accounting guidance relating to 
SPEs experience lower quality of accruals, measured by the accrual estimation errors 
38 
 
from the modified DD 2002 model (ABS_MDD) and the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the DD 2002 model and its modified version (STD_DD and STD_MDD).  
I then use matched pair control sample replacing “no material impact” group from the 
estimation and I find the accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD have 
consistent results as before.  
 When it comes to the differences between the two subgroups in the FIN 46 firms 
(firms consolidating VIEs and firms terminating or restructuring VIEs), the results 
consistently show that the accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD for 
firms consolidating VIEs (group 1) are consistently worsened compared to group 2, no 
matter which control sample is used. The differential change in accrual quality between 
the two groups can be partially attributed to the facts that group 1 have pressure to 
manage earnings when the consolidation bring negative effect on earnings. The empirical 
results of income-increasing earnings management confirm this point.  
 These results help us understand the changes in accrual quality for firms impacted 
by FIN 46. Although the consolidation process and improved disclosure may constrain 
earnings management through previously off-balance sheet SPEs, firms may resort to 
other methods that bypass VIEs to manipulate earnings, thus worsen the accrual quality 
in the post-FIN 46 periods.   
 My study is subject to limitations. First, the small sample size of the test sample 
affects the estimation accuracy of the regression analysis; second, the types of VIEs are 
not separated in the analysis. It is possible that the results are driven by certain category 
of VIEs, but not all.  
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CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF FIN 46 FOR INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
MOTIVATION 
 The first part of this dissertation research shows how the financial reporting 
quality changes with the implementation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46 hereinafter), Consolidation of Variable 
Interest Entities- An Interpretation of ARB No. 51. I now focus on effects of FIN 46 on 
investment decisions made by affected firms. More specifically I examine the investment 
efficiency of affected firms during the pre- and post-FIN46 periods. This particular 
question is important because of the following reasons. First, the implementation of FIN 
46 may have significant influence on financial reporting quality that includes quality of 
reported accounting numbers (i.e., accruals quality) and quality of disclosures. Second, 
FIN 46 likely to reduce affected firms’ financial flexibility by eliminating the opportunity 
to use certain off-balance sheet items and thus create financial constraints.  Prior studies 
show that investment efficiency is associated with quality of financial reporting as well as 
with financial constraints (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006, Biddle et al. 2009 etc.). Thus, 
FIN 46 provides a unique setting to test how the implementation of the accounting 
guidance affects investment efficiency. 
 Since the stated objectives of FIN 46 are to improve the transparency of financial 
reporting of firms with VIEs and to reduce the information asymmetry between firms and 
investors, the investment efficiency of firms affected by FIN 46 is expected to improve 
after the adoption of the standard. However, as the empirical findings of the first part of 
the dissertation suggest, the accruals quality of firms affected by FIN 46 becomes poorer 
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after the adoption of FIN 46 compared to firms not affected by the standard. Prior studies 
show that there is a positive relation between accruals quality and investment efficiency 
(e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006). From such perspective, the investment efficiency of firms 
affected by FIN 46 may decrease during the post-implementation periods since the 
quality of accruals for affected firms deteriorates. On the other hand, provisions in FIN 
46 mandate enhanced disclosures relating to VIEs, which may help improve information 
flow relating off-balance sheet activities through special purpose entities, which can 
mitigate information asymmetry and thus, may have positive effects on investment 
decisions. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate how FIN 46 affects investment 
efficiency of firms affected by the standard. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Firms’ investment is influenced by the marginal q and marginal cost of capital 
increase (Yoshikawa 1980; Hayashi 1982). Investment is efficient when firms choose 
projects that have positive net present value and when firms continue to invest efficiently 
until the marginal rate of return to investment become zero (Biddle et al. 2009). Prior 
research suggests that information asymmetries between firms’ management and 
investors can influence investment efficiency by creating economic frictions such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection, which can each lead to inefficient investment (Stein 
2003). The Moral hazard models suggest managers could choose to invest in projects that 
do not necessarily maximize the value of the firm when their incentives are incongruent 
with those of the investors (Berle and Means 1932; Williamson 1974; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Adverse selection occurs when managers have more information about 
the firm than investors, managers tend to act in favor of their own benefits (Myers and 
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Majluf, 1984). The level of investment is also affected by the availability of financial 
resources. Financial-constrained firms are more likely to under-invest and financial-
unconstrained firms are more likely to over-invest (e.g., Jensen 1986; Myers 1997; Opler 
et al. 1999; Richardson 2006).   
 Prior studies have shown that accounting quality is associated with investment 
efficiency (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Bens and Monahan 
2004; Lambert et al. 2007; Beatty et al. 2008; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Francis and 
Martin 2010; Bushman et al. 2011). Higher financial reporting quality can reduce moral 
hazard and adverse selection, thus mitigate information asymmetry and increase 
investment efficiency (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Verrecchia 2001).  Biddle and 
Hilary (2006) find higher accounting information quality enhances investment efficiency 
measured by investment-cash flow sensitivity, since the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors is reduced by higher-quality financial information. Biddle et al. 
(2009) provide further evidence that higher quality accounting information improves 
investment efficiency by reducing both over-investment and under-investment. Cheng et 
al. (2013) use a sample of firms disclosing internal control weakness (ICW) and find that 
these firms experience reduced under- (over-) investment after the disclosing of ICWs. 
The information problem signaled by ICWs should be fixed after the disclosure, thus the 
financial reporting quality is enhanced in the post-disclosure period.  
 The relation of financial accounting quality and investment efficiency is also 
investigated in international context. By focusing a sample of Spanish firms, Gomariz et 
al. (2014) investigate how investment efficiency is affected by financial reporting quality 
and debt maturity. They find over-investment is reduced by higher financial reporting 
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quality, and find both over- and under- investment can be reduced by lower debt 
maturity. Chen et al. (2011) focus private firms in emerging market to investigate the 
relation between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. They find a 
positive relation between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency, and the 
relation is affected by bank financing and tax saving incentives. Shroff et al. (2014) 
examine how the investment decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs) are affected 
by the information environment of the country-industry where the foreign subsidiary is 
located. They find the external information environment reduces the information frictions 
for the MNCs. In the country-industry where the information environment is more 
transparent, the investment decisions of the foreign subsidiaries are more related to the 
growth opportunities. 
 Some other factors also affect investment efficiency. The gap between the 
executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio is associated with 
managers’ likelihood of either under-investment or over-investment, thus affect 
investment efficiency (Eisdorfer et al. 2013). Beatty et al. (2013) examine how the 
investment of the peer companies of the fraud firms is affected the fraud committed. 
They find peer companies increase investment during the fraud period, and increase 
investment in “industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher 
private benefit of control”.  
  Investment efficiency is affected by financial accounting standards, which usually 
improve the disclosure. Biddle et al. (2011) find the mandatory adoption of IFRS helps 
increase investment efficiency since IFRS increases the disclosure and comparability of 
financial information, thus mitigate the information asymmetry. They measure 
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investment efficiency not only using the investment cash-flow sensitivity, but value 
enhancing-risk taking. 
 An extensively used measure for investment efficiency is investment – cash flow 
sensitivity. Fazzari et al. (1988) estimate investment – cash flow sensitivity by regressing 
investment on cash flows by controlling for Tobin’s Q, which is proxied by market-to-
book ratio. They find that financially constrained firms have investment that is more 
sensitive to cash flows than unconstrained firms. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find 
opposite results by using different method to partition the constrained and unconstrained 
firms. These conflicted results are reconciled by Moyen (2004), who find consistent 
results for either study by using different models.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Before FIN 46, SPEs are kept off the financial statements, causing information 
asymmetry between company’s internal management and external investors. Information 
asymmetry between managers and investors creates economic frictions resulting in 
inefficient investment decisions. FIN 46 improves disclosure and likely to reduce 
information asymmetry, which may mitigate problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Specifically, firms with VIEs affected by FIN 46 respond to the standard by 
consolidating, terminating, or restructuring their VIEs. Irrespective of responses by firms 
whether consolidating or restructuring VIEs, affected firms need to disclose detailed 
information about the nature, type and magnitude of transactions carried by those 
subsidiaries. Since more information is made available to investors after the 
implementation of FIN 46 by the affected firms, the information asymmetry between 
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managers and investors likely to reduce, thus the moral hazard caused by information 
asymmetry is mitigated. The decrease in the economic frictions due to the improvement 
in financial information disclosures is expected to result in increased investment 
efficiency.  
 However, as it is shown by the empirical results in the first part of the 
dissertation, the accrual quality of firms affected by FIN 46 decreases in the post-FIN 46 
periods compared to firms not affected by the standards. The lower quality of accruals 
after the implementation of FIN 46 is likely to have an adverse effects on the quality of 
investment decisions made by the affected firms.  
 Thus the implementation of FIN 46 may have either positive or adverse effects on 
investment efficiency of firms depending upon which effect dominates.  Considering the 
two perspectives above, I formulate a non-directional hypothesis, stated as follows: 
H3:  After FIN 46, firms with VIEs experience a change in investment efficiency 
compared to firms not affected by the standard. 
 Among the firms having VIEs and affected by FIN 46, some firms consolidated 
their VIEs while others avoid consolidation by restructuring or terminating the VIEs. 
Callahan et al. (2012) find that there is deferential effect on cost of capital between these 
two groups of firms. Firms consolidating their VIEs may have adverse effects on their 
leverage and profitability ratios, which create pressures on firms’ ability and flexibility in 
financing options and thus influence investment decisions. On the other hand, firms 
restructuring or terminating VIEs (group 2) have the flexibility or ability to avoid 
consolidation. Different features for the two groups can be reflected in the consequences 
from the empirical regularities relating to FIN 46. Furthermore, Bonsall IV and Bozanic 
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(2012) find that there is less information asymmetry related to consolidated VIEs than 
unconsolidated VIEs. Since reduced information asymmetry is associated with enhanced 
investment efficiency, firms consolidating VIEs are expected to experience greater 
improvement in investment efficiency than firms bypassing the consolidation by 
restructuring or terminating VIEs. 
 However, the first part of the dissertation shows that firms consolidating VIEs 
experience decreased accruals quality after the adoption of FIN 46 compared with firms 
keeping VIEs off the financial statements by terminating or restructuring these entities. 
Considering the opposite perspectives, the fourth hypothesis is stated as follows:  
H4:  After FIN 46, firms consolidating VIEs experience a change in investment 
efficiency compared to firms that terminate or restructure VIEs to avoid 
consolidation.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Investment Efficiency Measures 
 I use two complementary measures of investment efficiency, which are used in 
the extant Accounting and Finance literature.  
Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment (CFSI) 
 I use cash flow sensitivity of investment (CFSI) as a proxy for investment 
efficiency following Biddle and Hilary (2006). Underlying rationale of this measure as a 
proxy for investment efficiency is that the current level of investments should not be 
associated with the cash flows generated by the operation. In the absence of any 
economic frictions that trigger capital rationing or investing beyond optimum level, 
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investment decisions should be based on the expected rate of marginal returns from the 
investment projects, thus any association between investments and cash flows after 
controlling for growth opportunities is a reflection of inefficient investment. This 
measure is used extensively in prior literature (e.g., Fazzari et al. 1988; Hoshi et al. 
1991).  
 Investmenti,t =β0 + β1 OCFt + β2 MBi,t + ξi,t                                                             (7)      
 Investment is the sum of research and development expenditure, capital 
expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, 
and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled by lagged 
total assets. MB is market value of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q. β1 is the measure of investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Deviation from Expected Investment 
 Another measure of investment efficiency is the deviation from expected 
investment used by Biddle et al. (2009). Investment efficiency is measured based on the 
likelihood that a firm deviates from the expected investment level. They use a firm-
specific model of investment as a function of growth opportunities (as measured by sales 
growth) and use the residuals as a firm-specific proxy for deviations from expected 
investment. Considering the relation between investment and sales growth is related to 
the increase or decrease of the sales, Chen et al. (2011) also include an indicator variable 
of negative sales growth and its interaction with sales growth in the model to estimate the 
deviation from expected investment.  I used the absolute value of the residuals of the 
following model (INVEFF) as used in Chen et al. (2011) for my second measure of 
investment efficiency. 
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Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGi,t-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ξi,t     (8) 
Investmentt  is the sum of research and development expenditure, capital 
expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, 
and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. SalesGrowtht-1 is the percentage change in 
sales in year t-1. NEGt-1 is an indicator variable for negative sales growth in year t-1. 
Equation (8) is estimated for each industry-year based on the Fama and French 48-
industry classification for all industries with at least 20 observations in a given year from 
a sample of all observations in the Compustat database with available data.  The absolute 
value of the residuals (INVEFF1) is the investment efficiency measure.  
I also use two additional measures of investment efficiency, as used in Chen et al. 
(2011). The first one is estimated by adding lagged investment in Equation (8) (as shown 
in equation (9). The second one is estimated by replacing revenue growth with asset 
growth in Equation (8) (as shown in equation (10)) as the proxy for investment 
opportunities (first used by McNichols and Stubben, 2008).    
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1  
                      + λ4 Investmenti,t-1 + ξi,t+1                                                             (9)        
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1+ λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1  
                      + ξi,t                                                                                              (10) 
The absolute values of the residuals from these regressions are INVEFF2 and 
INVEFF3 respectively.  
Regression Models for Testing Hypotheses  
 To provide support for H3, I examine the change in cash flow sensitivity of 
investment for firms affected by FIN 46 and firms reporting no material impact by the 
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standard. I extend equation (7) by adding two indicator variables and interacting those 
indicator variables with the cash flow variable in the following model: 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t    
             +η3POST* OCFi,t + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t  + b2MBi,t  
                        + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                                                            (11) 
The variables are as described in previous equations. The variable of interest is 
POST*FIN46* OCFi,t.  
The absolute values of firm-specific residuals from Equation (8) and the two 
additional regressions described above are another set of investment efficiency measures 
(INVEFF1, INVEFF2, INVEFF3) that I use as dependent variables in the following 
model:    
					ܫܸܰܧܨܨ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅
																													∑ ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                       (12) 
 The control variables in equation (12) include the following: SIZE, logarithm of 
lagged total assets; Leverage, measured as total liability divided by total assets; ROA, 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; MB, the market value 
of equity divided by total assets; Tangibility, measured as property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets; K-structure, measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of 
long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale, operating cash flow divided by 
sales; Slack is cash divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator 
variable for firm paid a dividend; OPCycle, operating cycle measured as the sum of 365 
divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover. 
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Alternative Tests 
 I also did a set of alternative tests by combining the estimation of deviation from 
expected investment and the regression in the same equation.  
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1  
                                                    + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ΣγControl+ξi,t                            
                                                                                                                                        (13) 
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1  
                                   + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t + λ4 Investmenti,t-1      
                                   + ΣγControl +ξi,t                                                                           (14)           
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1  
                                   +λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1 + ΣγControl +ξi,t                       
                                                                                                                                        (15)          
 To test H4, I use group 2 as the control sample for group 1 to directly test the 
difference between them. I also use the same models above by adding indicator variables 
ONBOOK for firms consolidating VIEs and OFFBOOK for firms restructuring or 
terminating VIEs and their interaction with POST respectively (POST*ONBOOK and 
POST*OFFBOOK).  
DATA AND SAMPLE 
 Empirical analyses in this study are mainly conducted on a sample formed by 
manually identifying firms that are affected by FIN 46 and that disclose no material 
impact from FIN 46 in 10-K or 10-Q filings. To identify those firms I follow the 
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approach used by Callahan et al. (2012). To test hypotheses, I form three groups with 
sample firms depending on the effects of FIN 46 on those firms.   
Group 1: Consolidation Group (On-Book Group) 
 I used 10-K wizard to identify a sample of firms that consolidated their variable 
interest entities (VIEs) in 2003 by searching 10-K and 10-Q forms reported in 2004. To 
ensure the accuracy of the search, I used different combinations of key words that 
including the actual action of “consolidation” by the adoption of FIN 46, instead of the 
wording only describing the standard, like “have consolidated”, “has consolidated”, “we 
consolidated”. Some firms used passive voice, so I also used “was consolidated” and 
“were consolidated”.  In addition, some firms use “the company” to describe themselves 
so I also searched by “the company consolidated”. These searching methods returned 260 
unique firms. 
Group 2: Off-Book Group 
 I identified a sample of firms which keep their VIEs off books. Some firms with 
VIEs try to avoid consolidation by terminating, restructuring, divesting or disposing the 
VIEs, therefore I searched 10-K and 10-Q forms using these four key words combining 
with FIN 46. 113 unique firms are found through this searching method. 
 Feng et al. (2009) search likely VIEs in firms’ exhibit 21 and consider entities 
with the forms ‘‘Limited Partnership,’’ ‘‘L.P.,’’ ‘‘LP,’’ ‘‘LLC,’’ ‘‘L.L.C.,’’ or ‘‘trust”.  
As they stated, this selection process will possibly exclude SPEs that don’t have these 
organization forms or include SPEs that have been already consolidated in the financial 
statement. Since my research question focus on the impact of FIN 46, I find firms 
consolidating, terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 1 and group 2) by directly 
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searching the words “VIE”, “consolidated”, “terminated”, “restructured” in 10 forms. To 
ensure the accuracy of the test sample, I read each 10-K form to find the description of 
such actions.  
Group 3: No Impact Group 
 I found 1077 unique firms reporting “no impact” or “no material impact” from 
FIN 46 by searching in 10-K forms. 
Sample Derivation 
 Table 14 provides the sample selection process. Through the searching process 
using 10-K wizard and manually verifying 10-K and 10-Q , I find 260 firms that have 
adopted FIN 46 and consolidated VIEs in their financial statements (group 1). After 
eliminating firms with missing value to estimate variables used in empirical analyses and 
deleting firms in financial industries (SIC 6000-6999), this group is left with 135 firms. 
There are 1791 firm-year observations from 1988 – 2012 for group 1. Since my testing 
period is 1998 – 2007, the final sample for group 1 includes 784 firm-year observations.  
 Following the same sample deviation process, Group 2 and Group 3 have 361 and 
4728 firm-year observations respectively from 1998 – 2007.  
 The pre-FIN 46 periods are defined as 1998-2001, the post-FIN 46 periods are 
defined as 2004-2007. The transition periods 2002-2003 are excluded from the testing 
period.  
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics  
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 Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics for FIN 46 firms (group 1 & 2) and 
firms not impacted by FIN 46 (group 3) from 1998 to 2007.  The mean of INVEFF1, the 
absolute value of the residual of Chen et al. 2011 model, is 0.116 for the FIN 46 firms 
and 0.193 for the no impact firms. The mean of INVEFF2, the absolute value of residuals 
from equation (9), is 0.099 and 0.156 respectively for the two groups. The mean of 
INVEFF3, the absolute value of residuals from equation (10), is 0.119 and 0.174 for the 
test sample and the control sample respectively. Firms in group 3 “no impact group”  that 
is used as control sample in empirical analyses are characterized with relatively smaller 
in size, less profitable in terms of ROA and proportion of firms reporting losses, longer 
operating cycle and lower operating cash flows compared to firms in group 1 and 2, firms 
affected by FIN 46. Since firm characteristics of control group differ nontrivially from 
the test samples, I control for all firm characteristics in multiple regression models. In 
addition to controlling for the firm characteristics, I also use matched pair control sample 
to ensure the robustness of the results.   
Multiple Regression Analyses 
Investment Efficiency: Firms affected by FIN 46 versus Firms not Materially 
Impacted 
Investment Cash-Flow Sensitivity Tests 
 I test investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms affected by FIN 46 by using 
equation (11) and estimating it with two sets of control groups—firms disclosing no 
material impact (group 3) and matched pair control sample. 
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Group 3 as Control Sample  
 The regression results for the test of investment-cash flow sensitivity are 
presented in Table 16. Here test sample includes firms having VIEs affected by FIN 46 
(group 1 and 2). The control sample includes firms reporting no (material) impact from 
FIN 46 (group 3). The coefficient for market-to-book (MB) ratio is positive and highly 
significant (p<.0001) suggesting the level of investment is increasing in the firm’s growth 
opportunity. The coefficients for OCF and interaction variable FIN46*OCF are both 
negative and the coefficient for POST* OCF positive, which are all highly significant 
(p<.0001). These results suggest the investment-cash flow association is negative for the 
whole sample of firms either affected or disclosed no impact by FIN 46 and the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity increased significantly after the implementation FIN 46 
for all firms.  
The variable of interest is a three way interaction term POST*FIN46*OCF, which 
tests the difference-in-differences for investment-cash flow sensitivity between pre-and 
post-implementation period comparing firms affected by FIN 46 versus firms reporting 
no material impact. The coefficient of POST*FIN46*OCF is positive and highly 
significant (p<0.0001) which suggests that the investment of firms affected by FIN 46 is 
more sensitive to their cash flows after their adoption for FIN 46. While the investment-
cash flow sensitivity increased during the post implementation period for all firms 
included in the test, firms affected by FIN 46 have highly significant incremental effects. 
An increase in sensitivity of investment to cash flow for is an evidence of deterioration 
investment efficiency for firms affected by FIN 46.  
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Matched Pairs as Control Sample   
 As discussed in descriptive statistics, fundamental characteristics (viz. size, 
profitability, cash flow etc.) of firms group 3 that is used as control sample are 
significantly different from those of firms in test sample (group 1 and2). To address this 
concern, I also use a matched pair control sample that is formed by identifying a matched 
firms for each firm in test sample by using industry, size and ROA as matching 
variables.. Specifically, for each firm-year observation in the test sample, I chose a 
matched pair from all the firms not affected by FIN 46, in the same year and same 
industry, requiring the closest ROA by restricting size difference less than 1.  
 I estimate investment-cash flow sensitivity equation (11) with all observations in 
group 1 and 2 and matched pair sample. Results reported in Table 17 are consistent with 
those presented in the previous table, from the analyses using group 3 as control, with 
one exception that FIN46*OCF become insignificant. The coefficient of 
POST*FIN46*OCF is positive and highly significant (p<0.0001). Taken together, these 
findings suggests during the pre-implementation period firms subject to FIN 46 exhibit 
nontrivial sensitivity, which become incrementally significant during the post-
implementation period.   
Deviation from Expected Investment Analyses 
 In this subsection, I use three measures of investment efficiency, which are based 
on the deviation from the expected level of investments following prior studies (i.e., 
Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011 etc.). These three measures, labeled as INVEFF1, 
INVEFF2 and INVEFF3, absolute values of residuals from equation (8), (9) and (10) 
respectively, which are used as proxies for how the investment level is deviated from the 
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expected level in both directions.  Using these three proxies for investment efficiency, I 
estimate equation (12) to test H3 by using the matched pairs as the control sample and 
results are reported in Table 18. The coefficients for FIN46 are positive and significant at 
p-value below 5% level in all three estimations, suggesting that firms subject to FIN 46 
are less inefficient in investment decisions compared to matched pair control firms. The 
coefficient of POST*FIN46 is negative and significant for all the three measures 
(p=0.096 for INVEFF1; p=0.017 for INVEFF2; p=0.052 for INVEFF3).  These results 
suggest that the investment association are likely to improve for firms that are affected by 
FIN 46 (either consolidate VIEs or terminate/ restructure) and support hypothesis –H3.    
I then equations (13- 15) that use a specification combining both expectation 
models (eq. 9-11) and testing model (eq. 12). The results of these alternative tests for H3 
by using matched pairs as the control sample are presented in Table 19. The coefficients 
of POST*FIN46 are negative and significant for all the three models (p=0.071, 0.024 and 
0.008 respectively).  These results suggest that FIN 46 firms experience improved 
investment efficiency measured by deviation from expected investment compared to their 
matched pairs.  
Investment Efficiency: Firms Consolidated VIEs versus Firms Avoided 
Consolidation (H4) 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts firms consolidating VIEs are subject to a change in 
investment efficiency compared to firms that restructure or terminate VIEs to avoid 
consolidation. Consistent with previous section, I use two sets of measures— Investment-
cash flow sensitivity and deviation from expected level of investments.  
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Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Tests  
 The regression results for the test of investment-cash flow sensitivity are 
presented in Table 20. Here test sample includes firms consolidating VIEs (group 1) and 
the control sample includes firms that either terminate or restructure VIEs to avoid 
consolidation (group 2). The coefficient for market-to-book (MB) ratio is positive and 
highly significant (p<.0001) suggesting the level of investment is increasing in the firm’s 
growth opportunity. The coefficients for OCF is not significant however the interaction 
variable FIN46*OCF is negative and significant (p=.028).  The coefficient for POST* 
OCF positive and significant (p=.053). These results suggest that the investment-cash 
flow association is negative for the consolidating firms before FIN 46 and the sensitivity 
increases significantly after the implementation FIN 46 for both groups of firms.  
The variable of interest is a three way interaction term POST*FIN46*OCF, which 
tests the difference-in-differences for investment-cash flow sensitivity between pre-and 
post-implementation period comparing firms consolidating VIEs versus firms avoid 
consolidating. The coefficient of POST*FIN46*OCF is positive and marginally 
significant (p=.084 two tailed test) which suggests that the investment of firms 
consolidating VIEs is more sensitive to their cash flows after their adoption for FIN 46 
compared firms that restructure or terminate VIEs. An increase in sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow for is an evidence of deterioration investment efficiency for firms 
affected by FIN 46.   
Deviation from Expected Investment Analyses 
 I modify equations (13, 14 and 15) by replacing indicator variable FIN46 by two 
indicator variables ONBOOK (takes value of 1 if firms consolidate VIEs in their financial 
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statements) and OFFBOOK (takes value of 1 if firms restructure or terminate VIEs to 
avoid consolidation) to test how the investment efficiency change in firms consolidating 
VIEs are different from those firms restructuring or terminating VIEs. I use matched pair 
firms as the control sample to estimate these models and results are presented in Table 
21. The coefficients of POST*FIN46 are negative and significant for all the three models 
(p=0.071, 0.024 and 0.008 respectively).  These results suggest that FIN 46 firms 
experience improved investment efficiency measured by deviation from expected 
investment compared to their matched pairs. The coefficients for POST*ONBOOK are 
negative and significant (p values are 0.054, 0.019 and 0.019 respectively) for all the 
three models and POST*OFFBOOK is negative and marginally significant in one 
measure only. This result supports my hypothesis H4.  
 However, for the other test (INVEFF) for H4, the same sample construction yields 
no results.  
Additional Tests: Group 1 vs. Matched Pairs  
 Table 22 and Table 23 provide the results of the tests about the difference 
between group 1 and its matched pairs. The coefficient of POST*FIN46 is negative and 
significant for all the models. The same tests for group 2 and its matched pairs have no 
significant results. This represents the difference between group 1 and 2 from another 
perspective, suggesting that the investment efficiency for firms consolidating VIEs 
improves after FIN 46 compared to their peer firms, while firms restructuring or 
terminating VIEs don’t experience such improvement compared to their peers. However, 
when measuring investment efficiency using investment – cash flow sensitivity, I find 
opposite results (untabulated).  
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Explanation for Opposite Results using Investment – Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 I use two empirical proxies for investment efficiency, which are used in the extant 
literature, however, find completely opposite results. This subsection provides some 
explanations for the opposite results using investment-cash flow sensitivity. Prior 
literature shows that the extent to which firms are financial constrained affects investment 
– cash flow sensitivity (e.g., Fazzari et al. 2000).  One possible explanation is that the 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms affected by FIN 46 could be due to the 
effect of financial constraints. Therefore, I partition the test sample into a financial 
constrained group and a financial unconstrained group to further examine the change of 
investment – cash flow sensitivity for FIN 46 firms in the pre- and post- FIN 46 periods. I 
construct an index following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont et al. (2001) by 
using the following model: 
KZindex = -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.139*Leverage – 39.368*Dividends 
       -1.315*CashHoldings 
I assign the top (bottom) two quartiles as the financial constrained (unconstrained) group. 
 Table 24 present the regression results of H3 using no-impact firms as the control 
sample. For the financial constrained group, the coefficient of POST*FIN46*OCF is 
positive and highly significant (p<0.0001). On the other hand, the coefficient of 
POST*FIN46*OCF for unconstraint group is marginally significant and smaller than that 
of constraint group.. The results of the same test using matched pairs as the control 
sample is reported in Table 25. The coefficient of POST_FIN46_OCF for the constrained 
group is positive and significant (p=0.001), while that for the unconstrained group is not 
significant (p=0.319).  
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 Thus, finding from this analysis provide explanation that higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for firms affected by FIN 46 is driven due to the financial constraints, 
which also suggest that this proxy measures different dimension of investment decision.    
SUMMARY 
 This study examines the change in investment efficiency for firms affected by 
FIN 46. The results are mixed based on different proxies of investment efficiency. When 
using the investment – cash flow sensitivity to proxy for investment efficiency, I find 
firms affected by FIN 46 experience decreased investment efficiency indicated by 
increased investment sensitivity to cash flows, compared to firms reporting no material 
impact from FIN 46. The same results are found using matched pairs as the control 
sample of FIN 46 firms. I also find the investment of firms consolidating is more 
sensitive to cash flows after their adoption of FIN 46, compared to both the no-impact 
firms and matched pairs. 
  However, opposite results are found when using the deviation from expected 
investment as the proxy for investment efficiency. When comparing FIN 46 firms and 
their matched pairs, I find that FIN 46 firms experience improved investment efficiency 
measured by the deviation from expected investment after their adoption of FIN 46. 
Furthermore, I find firms consolidating VIEs experience improved investment efficiency 
measured by the deviation from expected investment after FIN 46 compared to their 
matched peers, while firms restructuring or terminating their VIEs don’s exhibit such 
improvement.   
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 This study contributes the literature about the economic consequence of FIN 46. It 
also adds to a growing stream of literature about investment efficiency. Nevertheless, 
there are some limitations in this study. First, the small sample size affects the 
generalization of the empirical results. Second, the mixed results are based on different 
models. Third, the models to estimate investment efficiency is still evolving, thus the 
interpretation of the results is subject to the validity of different models. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 
(FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities- An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, 
in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with an objective to improve the 
transparency of financial information. Under FIN 46, companies are required to 
consolidate special purpose entities (SPEs) on the financial statements if they are the 
primary beneficiaries of the SPEs, regardless of their voting interests in the entities. This 
study investigates whether the implementation of this new guidance affects accruals 
quality and investment efficiency of firms impacted by FIN 46.  
 The first part of my dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on accruals 
quality. I conduct tests using several different measures of accrual quality: the absolute 
value of performance-matched abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005); the accrual estimation errors of the DD 2002 model 
and its modified version suggested by McNichols (2002); the original DD 2002 accrual 
quality measures and its modified version suggested by McNichols (2002) and applied in 
Francis et al. (2005). I find that compared to firms reporting no material impact from FIN 
46, firms impacted by FIN 46 experience worsened accrual quality, measured by the 
accrual estimation errors in the modified DD 2002 model (ABS_MDD) and the standard 
deviation of the residuals in the DD 2002 model and its modified version (STD_DD and 
STD_MDD), after consolidating, terminating or restructuring their VIEs. In additional 
analysis, I replace the control sample with a matched pair sample. The accrual quality 
measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD have consistent results as before.  
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 I also examine the differences between the two subgroups in the FIN 46 firms 
(firms consolidating VIEs and firms terminating or restructuring VIEs). The results of the 
tests consistently show that the accrual quality measured by ABS_MDD and STD_MDD 
for firms consolidating VIEs (group 1) are consistently lower compared to firms 
terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 2), no matter which control sample is used. The 
differential change in accrual quality between the two groups can be partially attributed 
to the facts that group 1 have pressure to manage earnings when the consolidation brings 
negative effects on earnings, which are confirmed by the empirical tests using signed 
abnormal accrual measures. 
 In the second part of the dissertation, I focus on the effects of FIN 46 on 
investment decisions made by affected firms. More specifically, I examine the investment 
efficiency of affected firms during the pre- and post-FIN46 periods. An important 
determinant of firms’ economic productivity and future performance is the investment 
efficiency, which can be affected by accounting information quality. Poor accounting 
quality (such as the opaqueness of accounting information caused by the use of off-
balance sheet items) exacerbates information asymmetry between firms and investors. 
Prior research suggests that information asymmetry can create either liquidity constraints 
or excess liquidity, both of which are associated with investment inefficiency (Biddle and 
Hilary 2006). Measuring investment efficiency using the deviation from expected 
investment (Chen et al. 2011), the empirical results show that firms affected by FIN 46 
experience improved investment efficiency after the adoption of FIN 46, compared to a 
sample of matched firms that are not affected by FIN 46. Among these FIN 46 firms, 
firms consolidating VIEs experience greater improvement than those restructuring or 
63 
 
terminating VIEs.  However, when measuring investment efficiency using the investment 
– cash flow sensitivity, I find opposite results. The investment of firms affected by FIN 
46 becomes more sensitive to cash flows after the adoption of FIN 46, compared to both 
no-impact firms and matched pairs. The investment of firms consolidating VIEs is more 
sensitive to cash flows compared to firms terminating or restructuring VIEs after their 
adoption of FIN 46.  
 The findings in my study are subject to some limitations. First, the small sample 
size of the test sample affects the estimation accuracy of the regression analysis. Second, 
the types of VIEs are not separated in the analysis. It is possible that the results are driven 
by certain category of VIEs, but not all. Third, the results are based on the measures of 
investment efficiency estimated from several models. The models to estimate investment 
efficiency are still evolving, thus the interpretation of the results is subject to the validity 
of different models. 
 My dissertation contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it adds to 
the literature on impact of FIN 46. Prior studies investigate the economic consequences 
of FIN 46 from the perspective of market participants’ responsiveness such as cost of 
capital (Callahan et al. 2012), analyst forecast precision and earnings response 
coefficients (Gurun et al. 2012). No extant research tests the impact of the changes in 
SPE consolidation rules on the quality of reported accounting numbers. This study fills 
this void by examining the effects of FIN 46 on accrual quality. Second, this study 
contributes to the stream of studies about off-balance sheet items in general. While prior 
studies provide evidence that firms with SPEs manage earnings through off-balance sheet 
activities, this study extends prior research by testing whether the changes in rules related 
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to SPEs affect the quality of accruals. Third, this study contributes to the literature that 
examines how mandatory changes in accounting standards affect financial reporting 
quality. Fourth, it contributes to the literature by extending a relatively smaller but 
growing stream of research on how the quality of accounting information affects 
investment efficiency. 
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TABLE 1 Panel A: Sample Deviation - AA Measures 
 
Group 1:                   
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 260
Number of firms that have non-missing values for AA measures 184
After excluding  financial firms 144
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 2580
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 1225
    
Group 2:  
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 113
Number of firms that have non-missing values for AA measures 85
After excluding  financial firms 69
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 1301
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 592
   
Group 3:   
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 1077
Number of firms that have non-missing values for AA measures 775
After excluding  financial firms 719
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 10632
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007    5690
 
Table 1 panel A provides the sample derivation for empirical analyses of abnormal accrual 
measures: abnormal total accruals (AA), working capital accrual (AWCA), performance-matched 
abnormal total accrual (PM_AA) and working capital accruals (PM_AWCA). Group 1 is defined 
for firms consolidating VIEs. Group 2 is defined for firms restructuring or terminating VIES to 
avoid consolidating. Group 3 is defined for firms reporting no (material) impact from FIN 46. 
Searching using 10-K wizard, 260 firms are found in group 1. The sample is narrowed down to 
184 firms after excluding firms with missing observations to estimate abnormal accruals. After 
deleting firms in financial industries (SIC 6000-6999), 144 firms left. There are 2580 firm-year 
observations from 1988 – 2012 for group 1. Since my testing period is 1998 – 2007, the final 
sample for group 1 includes 1225 firm-year observations. Following the same sample deviation 
process, Group 2 and Group 3 have 592 and 5690 firm-year observations respectively from 1998 
– 2007.  
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TABLE 1 Panel B: Sample Deviation – DD Measures 
 
Group 1:                   
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 260
Number of firms that have non-missing values for DD, MDD 121
After excluding  financial firms 104
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 1074
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 509
    
Group 2:  
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 113
Number of firms that have non-missing values for DD, MDD 49
After excluding  financial firms 45
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 360
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 159
   
Group 3:   
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 1077
Number of firms that have non-missing values for DD, MDD 593
After excluding  financial firms 562
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 4672
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007    2690
 
Table 1 panel B provides the sample derivation for the tests on accrual quality measured using the 
accrual estimation errors from the DD model. Group 1 is defined for firms consolidating VIEs. 
Group 2 is defined for firms restructuring or terminating VIES to avoid consolidating. Group 3 is 
defined for firms reporting no (material) impact from FIN 46. Searching using 10-K wizard, 260 
firms are found in group 1. The sample is narrowed down to 121 firms after excluding firms with 
missing observations to estimate DD and MDD. After deleting firms in financial industries (SIC 
6000-6999), 104 firms left. There are 1074 firm-year observations from 1988 – 2012 for group 1. 
Since my testing period is 1998 – 2007, the final sample for group 1 includes 509 firm-year 
observations. Following the same sample deviation process, Group 2 and Group 3 have 159 and 
2690 firm-year observations respectively from 1998 – 2007.  
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TABLE 2 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Sample for AA Measures 
 
Group 1         
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD
Size 7.693 6.488 7.931 9.243 2.116
Leverage 0.628 0.491 0.663 0.761 0.224
OCF 0.064 0.039 0.076 0.122 0.147
SGROWTH 0.122 -0.004 0.050 0.159 0.385
ROA 0.005 0.008 0.033 0.059 0.149
LOG_CYCLE 4.533 4.059 4.561 5.001 0.837
AA -0.007 -0.034 -0.001 0.028 0.097
AWCA -0.003 -0.028 -0.002 0.026 0.093
PMAA 0.032 0.006 0.039 0.068 0.097
PMAWCA 0.021 -0.004 0.023 0.050 0.093
ABS_AA 0.060 0.014 0.031 0.069 0.089
ABS_AWCA 0.057 0.012 0.027 0.060 0.091
ABS_PMAA 0.072 0.027 0.049 0.083 0.084
ABS_PMAWCA 0.062 0.017 0.035 0.068 0.091
# of firms  144  
# of observations 1225  
   
Group 2    
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD
Size 7.858 6.446 7.673 9.266 1.959
Leverage 0.632 0.487 0.642 0.773 0.242
OCF 0.084 0.041 0.077 0.122 0.090
SGROWTH 0.114 -0.014 0.042 0.148 0.305
ROA 0.014 0.000 0.028 0.055 0.104
LOG_CYCLE 4.547 4.092 4.599 4.937 0.702
AA -0.010 -0.043 -0.005 0.027 0.088
AWCA -0.008 -0.031 -0.005 0.020 0.080
PMAA 0.030 -0.004 0.034 0.066 0.088
PMAWCA 0.016 -0.006 0.019 0.045 0.080
ABS_AA 0.060 0.015 0.036 0.074 0.079
ABS_AWCA 0.051 0.011 0.025 0.060 0.078
ABS_PMAA 0.069 0.025 0.046 0.083 0.080
ABS_PMAWCA 0.055 0.015 0.032 0.063 0.078
# of firms  69  
# of observations 592  
    
Group 3    
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD
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Size 5.173 3.701 5.179 6.581 2.142
Leverage 0.568 0.278 0.498 0.701 0.470
OCF -0.023 -0.056 0.058 0.127 0.323
SGROWTH 0.132 -0.019 0.068 0.222 0.406
ROA -0.111 -0.140 0.014 0.067 0.359
LOG_CYCLE 4.763 4.369 4.766 5.173 0.715
AA -0.028 -0.070 -0.008 0.045 0.191
AWCA -0.020 -0.058 -0.006 0.041 0.180
PMAA 0.012 -0.030 0.031 0.085 0.191
PMAWCA 0.004 -0.034 0.018 0.065 0.180
ABS_AA 0.116 0.024 0.058 0.134 0.160
ABS_AWCA 0.107 0.020 0.049 0.121 0.153
ABS_PMAA 0.121 0.031 0.067 0.139 0.156
ABS_PMAWCA 0.109 0.023 0.054 0.123 0.151
# of firms  719  
# of observations 5690      
 
Table 2 panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the (performance-matched) abnormal total 
accruals, (performance-matched) working capital accruals and the control variables for the three 
groups of firms from 1998 - 2007. Variable descriptions are as follows: ABS_AA is the absolute 
values of abnormal total accruals;  ABS_AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital 
accruals; ABS_PMAA  is the absolute values of performance-matched abnormal total accruals;   
ABS_PMAWCA is the absolute values of performance-matched working capital accruals; SIZE is 
logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; 
OCF is measured as operating cash flow divided by lagged total assets; SGROWTH is measured 
as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is 
measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory. 
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TABLE 2 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics - Sample for DD Measures 
 
Group 1         
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD 
Size 7.301 6.335 7.550 8.800 2.060
Leverage 0.632 0.463 0.674 0.757 0.242
OCF 0.058 0.034 0.071 0.116 0.141
SGROWTH 0.109 -0.007 0.048 0.179 0.341
ROA -0.004 0.007 0.030 0.055 0.164
LOG_CYCLE 4.519 4.179 4.534 4.925 0.744
ABS_DD 0.043 0.010 0.024 0.048 0.060
ABS_MDD 0.034 0.008 0.020 0.041 0.045
STD_DD 0.046 0.018 0.031 0.052 0.058
STD_MDD 0.032 0.014 0.023 0.037 0.037
# of firms  104   
# of observations 509   
    
Group 2    
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD 
Size 6.836 5.936 7.013 7.836 1.597
Leverage 0.524 0.279 0.529 0.672 0.260
OCF 0.070 0.020 0.078 0.120 0.108
SGROWTH 0.192 -0.020 0.060 0.220 0.442
ROA -0.012 -0.015 0.030 0.060 0.191
LOG_CYCLE 4.690 4.298 4.723 5.132 0.555
ABS_DD 0.037 0.012 0.028 0.051 0.033
ABS_MDD 0.031 0.013 0.023 0.042 0.027
STD_DD 0.043 0.021 0.038 0.059 0.027
STD_MDD 0.037 0.021 0.032 0.045 0.025
# of firms  45   
# of observations 159   
    
Group 3    
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD 
Size 4.767 3.297 4.720 6.187 2.098
Leverage 0.525 0.236 0.446 0.683 0.418
OCF -0.049 -0.099 0.043 0.120 0.328
SGROWTH 0.139 -0.032 0.069 0.235 0.428
ROA -0.149 -0.212 0.005 0.067 0.425
LOG_CYCLE 4.851 4.453 4.844 5.223 0.738
ABS_DD 0.066 0.018 0.041 0.083 0.076
ABS_MDD 0.058 0.015 0.034 0.071 0.071
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STD_DD 0.078 0.030 0.054 0.097 0.080
STD_MDD 0.065 0.023 0.041 0.082 0.069
# of firms  562   
# of observations 2690       
 
Table 2 panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the accrual estimation errors from Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model, the standard deviation for the accrual estimation errors developed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), and the control variables in the regression models. ABS_DD is the 
absolute value  of the estimation errors from DD 2002 model; ABS_MDD is the absolute value of 
the estimation errors from modified DD 2002 model; STD_DD is the standard deviation of the 
estimation errors from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation 
error from modified DD 2002 model; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is 
measured as total liability divided by total assets; OCF is measured as operating cash flow 
divided by lagged total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged 
total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; 
LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of 
accounts receivable and average days of inventory. 
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TABLE 3: Regression of Absolute Value of  
Performance-Matched Abnormal Accruals (H1) 
 
           
   ABS_PMAA ABS_PMAWCA
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.072 <0.0001 0.059 <0.0001
    
POST -0.006 0.097 -0.004 0.187
    
FIN46 0.000 0.970 -0.004 0.378
    
POST*FIN46 0.007 0.304 0.010 0.142
    
Leverage 0.046 <0.0001 0.043 <0.0001
    
SGROWTH 0.058 <0.0001 0.057 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.101 <0.0001 -0.094 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.012 <0.0001 -0.012 <0.0001
   
OCF -0.063 <0.0001 -0.063 <0.0001
   
OCF2 0.010 <0.0001 0.013 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.014 <0.0001 0.014 <0.0001
    
Adj. R2 27.50% 29.28%   
N 4670  4670   
 
Table 3 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ൅ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                      (5)   
                                                                   
AQ here are the performance-matched abnormal total accruals (ABS_PMAA ) and the 
performance-matched abnormal working capital accruals (ABS_PMAWCA). ABS_PMAA  is the 
absolute values of performance-matched abnormal total accruals;   ABS_PMAWCA is the absolute 
values of performance-matched working capital accruals. POST is an indicator variable for 
testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator variable for firms affected by FIN 46, that is, firms 
having VIEs subject to consolidation requirement. These firms chose either consolidated VIEs or 
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keeping VIEs off the financial statement by restructuring or terminating VIEs; SIZE is logarithm 
of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; OCF is 
measured as operating cash flow divided by lagged total assets; OCF2 is the quadratic term of 
OCF; SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of 
operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and 
average days of inventory. All three groups of firms in the sample are used in estimating 
regressions, where the test sample consists of observations in Groups 1 and 2, and control sample 
with observations in Group 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
TABLE 4: Regression of Accrual Estimation Errors (H1) 
 
   ABS_DD ABS_MDD 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.047 0.007 0.030 0.047
   
POST -0.004 0.406 0.000 0.972
   
FIN46 0.000 0.960 -0.004 0.479
   
POST*FIN46 0.012 0.205 0.017 0.032
   
Leverage 0.039 <0.0001 0.037 <0.0001
   
SGROWTH 0.025 <0.0001 0.025 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.010 <0.0001 -0.009 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.045 <0.0001 -0.050 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.01 0.002 0.010 0.000
    
Adj. R2 18.32% 22.00%   
N 1557  1557   
Table 4 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ൅ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                      (5)        
                                                              
AQ here are ABS_DD and ABS_MDD. ABS_DD is the absolute value  of the estimation errors 
from DD 2002 model; ABS_MDD is the absolute value of the estimation errors from modified 
DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator 
variable for firms affected by FIN 46, that is, firms having VIEs subject to consolidation 
requirement. These firms chose either consolidated VIEs or keeping VIEs off the financial 
statement by restructuring or terminating VIEs; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  
is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the change in 
sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum 
of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory. All three groups of firms in 
the sample are used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of observations in 
Groups 1 and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3. 
 
74 
 
TABLE 5: Regression of Standard Deviation of  
Accrual Estimation Errors (H1) 
 
   STD_DD STD_MDD 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.016 0.036 0.025 0.049
   
POST -0.018 <0.0001 -0.007 0.026
   
FIN46 -0.007 0.337 -0.005 0.321
   
POST*FIN46 0.019 0.035 0.012 0.075
   
Leverage 0.025 0.001 0.020 0.000
   
SGROWTH 0.026 <0.0001 0.021 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.012 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.024 0.006 -0.022 0.000
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.024 <0.0001 0.016 <0.0001
Adj. R2 22.23% 24.92%   
N 1321  1320   
 
Table 5 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ൅ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                       (5)              
                                                        
AQ here are STD_DD and STD_MDD. STD_DD is the standard deviation of the estimation errors 
from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation error from modified 
DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator 
variable for firms affected by FIN 46, that is, firms having VIEs subject to consolidation 
requirement. These firms chose either consolidated VIEs or keeping VIEs off the financial 
statement by restructuring or terminating VIEs; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  
is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the change in 
sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum 
of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory. All three groups of firms in 
the sample are used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of observations in 
Groups 1 and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3. 
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TABLE 6: Regression of Absolute Value of  
Performance-Matched Abnormal Accruals (H2) 
 
          
   ABS_PMAA ABS_PMAWCA
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.072 <0.0001 0.059 <0.0001
   
POST -0.006 0.097 -0.004 0.187
   
FIN46_CON -0.001 0.894 -0.002 0.699
   
FIN46_OFF 0.002 0.781 -0.009 0.238
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.006 0.420 0.008 0.309
   
POST*FIN46_OFF 0.008 0.465 0.013 0.191
   
Leverage 0.046 <0.0001 0.042 <0.0001
   
SGROWTH 0.058 <0.0001 0.058 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.101 <0.0001 -0.094 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.012 <0.0001 -0.012 <0.0001
   
OCF -0.063 <0.0001 -0.063 <0.0001
   
OCF2 0.010 <0.0001 0.013 <0.0001
    
LOG_CYCLE 0.014 <0.0001 0.014 <0.0001
    
Adj. R2 27.47% 29.26%   
N 4670  4670   
 
Table 6 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߜଵܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߜଶܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߜଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ
ܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ 	ߜସܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅
	ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ε୲                            (6)                          
 
AQ here are ABS_PMAA and ABS_PMAWCA. ABS_PMAA  is the absolute values of 
performance-matched abnormal total accruals; ABS_PMAWCA is the absolute values of 
performance-matched working capital accruals; POST is an indicator variable for testing years 
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after 2003; FIN46_CON is an indicator variable for firms  in groups 1- firms consolidating VIEs; 
FIN46_OFF is an indicator variable for firms in group 2- firms avoiding consolidating by 
keeping VIEs off the financial statement. They terminated or restructured VIEs; SIZE is logarithm 
of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; OCF is 
measured as operating cash flow divided by lagged total assets; OCF2 is the quadratic term of 
OCF; SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of 
operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and 
average days of inventory. All three groups of firms in the sample are used in estimating 
regressions, where the test sample consists of observations in Groups 1 and 2, and control sample 
with observations in Group 3. 
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TABLE 7: Regression of Accrual Estimation Errors (H2) 
          
   ABS_DD ABS_MDD
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.046 0.008 0.030 0.048
   
POST -0.003 0.419 0.000 0.960
   
FIN46_CON 0.003 0.692 -0.002 0.765
   
FIN46_OFF -0.008 0.500 -0.009 0.365
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.014 0.170 0.018 0.042
   
POST*FIN46_OFF 0.003 0.837 0.013 0.372
   
Leverage 0.038 <0.0001 0.036 <0.0001
   
SGROWTH 0.026 <0.0001 0.025 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.011 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.045 <0.0001 -0.050 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.000
    
Adj. R2 18.40% 21.98%   
N 1557  1557   
 
Table 7 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߜଵܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߜଶܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߜଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ
ܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ 	ߜସܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅
	ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ε୲                            (6)                          
 
AQ here are ABS_DD and ABS_MDD. ABS_DD is the absolute value  of the estimation errors 
from DD 2002 model; ABS_MDD is the absolute value of the estimation errors from modified 
DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46_CON is an 
indicator variable for firms  in groups 1- firms consolidating VIEs; FIN46_OFF is an indicator 
variable for firms in group 2- firms avoiding consolidating by keeping VIEs off the financial 
statement. They terminated or restructured VIEs; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; 
Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the 
change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items 
78 
 
divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured 
as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory. All three groups 
of firms in the sample are used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of 
observations in Groups 1 and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3. 
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TABLE 8: Regression of Standard Deviation of  
Accrual Estimation Errors (H2) 
 
          
   STD_DD STD_MDD
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.016 0.370 0.025 0.048
   
POST -0.018 <0.0001 -0.007 0.026
   
FIN46_CON -0.004 0.668 -0.005 0.437
   
FIN46_OFF -0.013 0.264 -0.006 0.516
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.023 0.026 0.014 0.051
   
POST*FIN46_OFF 0.008 0.624 0.003 0.768
   
Leverage 0.024 0.001 0.020 0.000
   
SGROWTH 0.026 <0.0001 0.021 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.012 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.024 0.005 -0.022 0.000
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.025 <0.0001 0.016 <0.0001
   
Adj. R2 22.37% 24.91%  
N 1321  1320  
 
Table 8 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߜଵܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ ߜଶܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߜଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ
ܨܫܰ46_ܥܱ ௧ܰ ൅ 	ߜସܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46_ܱܨܨ௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅
	ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ε୲                            (6)                          
 
AQ here are STD_DD and STD_MDD. STD_DD is the standard deviation of the estimation errors 
from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation error from modified 
DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46_CON is an 
indicator variable for firms in groups 1- firms consolidating VIEs; FIN46_OFF is an indicator 
variable for firms in group 2- firms avoiding consolidating by keeping VIEs off the financial 
statement. They terminated or restructured VIEs; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; 
Leverage is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the 
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change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items 
divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured 
as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory. All three groups 
of firms in the sample are used in estimating regressions, where the test sample consists of 
observations in Groups 1 and 2, and control sample with observations in Group 3. 
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Table 9 Panel A: Additional Analysis of H1  
- FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 panel A provides the univariate test for the difference between the accrual quality measures in the pre- and post- FIN 46 periods for 
the FIN 46 firms and the matched pairs. ABS_AA is the absolute values of abnormal total accruals;  ABS_AWCA is the absolute value of 
abnormal working capital accruals; ABS_PMAA  is the absolute values of performance-matched abnormal total accruals;   ABS_PMAWCA is 
  FIN46=1 (Group 1&2) FIN46=0 (matched pair)
pre-
2003
post-
2003 Change pre-2003
post-
2003 Change  
Difference-
in 
differences
Accrual Quality     
ABS_DD 0.040 0.039 0.001 0.037 0.028 (0.009)***  0.011**
N 991 443 865 401    
ABS_MDD 0.030 0.032 0.002 0.030 0.024 (0.006)***  0.008**
N 991 443 865 401   
STD_DD 0.040 0.044 0.004 0.036 0.034 (0.002)  0.010**
N 551 360 459 325    
STD_MDD 0.029 0.036 0.007** 0.029 0.029 0.000  0.007**
N 551 360 459 325    
ABS_AA 0.072 0.057 (0.015)*** 0.066 0.056 (0.010)*  0.001
N 735 686 643 594    
ABS_AWCA 0.065 0.052 (0.013)** 0.059 0.048 (0.011)**  0.004
N 735 686 643 594    
ABS_PMAA 0.083 0.068 (0.015)*** 0.078 0.063 (0.015)***  0.005
N 735 686 643 594    
ABS_PMAWCA 0.069 0.059 (0.010)* 0.065 0.052 (0.013)**  0.007
N 735 686  643 594      
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the absolute values of performance-matched working capital accruals; ABS_DD is the absolute value  of the estimation errors from DD 2002 
model; ABS_MDD is the absolute value of the estimation errors from modified DD 2002 model; STD_DD is the standard deviation of the 
estimation errors from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation error from modified DD 2002 model. 
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Table 9 Panel B: Additional Analysis of H1  
- FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
 
                  
   ABS_MDD STD_MDD ABS_DD STD_DD
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.017 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.014 0.112 0.005 0.658
   
POST 0.002 0.471 0.004 0.127 0.001 0.643 0.006 0.096
   
FIN46 -0.002 0.366 -0.001 0.721 0.000 0.985 0.003 0.311
   
POST*FIN46 0.008 0.015 0.008 0.029 0.006 0.165 0.006 0.195
   
Leverage 0.002 0.575 -0.004 0.448 0.013 0.027 0.005 0.387
   
SGROWTH 0.021 <0.0001 0.018 <0.0001 0.035 <0.0001 0.030 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.005 <0.0001 -0.006 <0.0001 -0.008 <0.0001 -0.008 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.043 <0.0001 -0.057 <0.0001 -0.027 0.018 -0.074 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.010 <0.0001 0.012 <0.0001 0.014 <0.0001 0.019 <0.0001
   
Adj. R2 12.82% 14.73% 15.03% 19.40%  
N 2296  1462   2296   1462  
 
Table 9 Panel B provides the regression results of the following model:  
84 
 
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅
ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                           (5)                                                    
AQ here are ABS_DD, ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD. ABS_DD is the absolute value  of the estimation errors from DD 2002 model; 
ABS_MDD is the absolute value of the estimation errors from modified DD 2002 model; STD_DD is the standard deviation of the estimation 
errors from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation error from modified DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator 
variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator variable for firms affected by FIN 46, that is, firms having VIEs subject to 
consolidation requirement. These firms chose either consolidated VIEs or keeping VIEs off the financial statement by restructuring or 
terminating VIEs; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is 
measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; 
LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of 
inventory.  
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Table 10: Additional Analysis of H2 
-Group 1 and Matched Pairs 
                  
   ABS_MDD STD_MDD ABS_DD STD_DD
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.019 0.010 0.020 0.039 0.024 0.013 0.009 0.452
   
POST 0.002 0.424 0.007 0.043 0.004 0.336 0.009 0.022
   
FIN46 -0.002 0.256 -0.002 0.499 0.000 0.916 0.002 0.492
   
POST*FIN46 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.027 0.007 0.148 0.007 0.220
   
Leverage 0.003 0.602 0.003 0.680 0.008 0.233 0.010 0.194
   
SGROWTH 0.017 <0.0001 0.013 0.000 0.026 <0.0001 0.016 0.000
   
SIZE -0.006 <0.0001 -0.007 <0.0001 -0.008 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.034 <0.0001 -0.025 0.068 -0.033 0.010 -0.021 0.238
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.013 <0.0001 0.013 <0.0001 0.014 <0.0001 0.021 <0.0001
   
Adj. R2 13.91% 15.63% 15.05% 19.67%  
N 1798  1158   1798   1158  
 
Table 10 provides the regression results of the following model:  
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ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅
ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                           (5)                                                    
AQ here are ABS_DD, ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD. The test sample includes firms consolidating VIEs (group 1), the control sample 
includes group 1 firms’ matched pairs. ABS_DD is the absolute value  of the estimation errors from DD 2002 model; ABS_MDD is the 
absolute value of the estimation errors from modified DD 2002 model; STD_DD is the standard deviation of the estimation errors from DD 
2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation error from modified DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for 
testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator variable for firms consolidating VIEs (group 1); SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; 
Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; 
ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured 
as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of inventory.  
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Table 11: Additional Analysis of H2 
- Group 1 and Group 2 
                 
   ABS_DD ABS_MDD STD_DD STD_MDD
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.047 0.007 0.030 0.049 0.016 0.364 0.025 0.047
   
POST -0.003 0.459 0.001 0.759 -0.017 <0.0001 -0.007 0.029
   
FIN46_CON 0.004 0.607 -0.001 0.857 -0.002 0.808 -0.004 0.498
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.014 0.176 0.018 0.051 0.022 0.031 0.014 0.055
   
Leverage 0.038 <0.0001 0.036 <0.0001 0.024 0.001 0.020 0.000
   
SGROWTH 0.025 <0.0001 0.025 <0.0001 0.027 <0.0001 0.021 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.011 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001 -0.013 <0.0001 -0.010 <0.0001
   
ROA -0.045 <0.0001 -0.050 <0.0001 -0.024 0.006 -0.022 0.000
   
LOG_CYCLE 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.025 <0.0001 0.016 <0.0001
   
Adj. R2 18.47% 22.04% 22.40% 25.00%  
N 1557  1557  1321   1320  
Table 11 provides the regression results of the following model:  
ܣܳ௧ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅
ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                           (5)                                                   
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AQ here are ABS_DD, ABS_MDD, STD_DD and STD_MDD. The test sample includes firms consolidating VIEs (group 1), the control sample 
includes firms terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 2). ABS_MDD is the absolute value of the estimation errors from modified DD 2002 
model; STD_DD is the standard deviation of the estimation errors from DD 2002 model; STD_MDD is the standard deviation of the estimation 
error from modified DD 2002 model; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46 is an indicator variable for firms 
consolidating VIEs (group 1); SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; 
SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged 
total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average 
days of inventory.  
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Table 12: Additional Analysis for Group 1 and 2 
 - AA and AWCA 
 
         
   AA AWCA
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.079 <0.0001 0.079 <0.0001
   
POST -0.018 0.000 -0.011 0.013
   
FIN46_CON -0.009 0.048 -0.001 0.862
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.012 0.049 0.010 0.072
   
Leverage 0.018 0.030 -0.012 0.101
   
SGROWTH -0.030 <0.0001 -0.015 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.004 <0.0001 -0.003 <0.0001
   
ROA 0.800 <0.0001 0.696 <0.0001
   
OCF -0.588 <0.0001 -0.608 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE -0.003 0.168 -0.002 0.177
    
Adj. R2 62.43% 64.14%   
N 1174  1174   
 
Table 12 provides the regression results of the following model:  
 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                               
 
EM  is earnings management measured by AA and AWCA. The test sample includes firms 
consolidating VIEs (group 1), the control sample includes firms terminating or restructuring VIEs 
(group 2). AA is abnormal total accruals;  AWCA is abnormal working capital accruals; POST is 
an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; FIN46_CON is an indicator variable for firms 
consolidating VIEs (group 1); SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as 
total liability divided by total assets; OCF is measured as operating cash flow divided by lagged 
total assets; SGROWTH is measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is 
the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm 
of operating cycle, which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and 
average days of inventory. 
90 
 
Table 13: Additional Analysis for Group 1 and 2 
- PMAA and PMAWCA 
 
   PMAA PMAWCA
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.118 <0.0001 0.103 <0.0001
   
POST -0.018 0.000 -0.011 0.013
   
FIN46_CON -0.009 0.048 -0.001 0.862
   
POST*FIN46_CON 0.012 0.049 0.010 0.072
   
Leverage 0.018 0.030 -0.012 0.101
   
SGROWTH -0.030 <0.0001 -0.015 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.004 <0.0001 -0.003 <0.0001
   
ROA 0.800 <0.0001 0.696 <0.0001
   
OCF -0.588 <0.0001 -0.608 <0.0001
   
LOG_CYCLE -0.003 0.168 -0.002 0.177
    
Adj. R2 62.43% 64.14%   
N 1174   1174   
 
Table 13 provides the regression results of the following model:  
 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ൅ߚଵܱܲܵܶ2003௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵܶ2003 ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௧ ൅ߚହܩܴܱܹܶܪ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܣ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܱܥܨ௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܥܨ2௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܱܩ_ܥܻܥܮܧ௧ ൅ ߝ௧                                               
 
EM  is earnings management measured by PMAA and PMAWCA. The test sample includes firms 
consolidating VIEs (group 1), the control sample includes firms terminating or restructuring VIEs 
(group 2). PMAA is performance-matched abnormal total accruals; PMAWCA is the absolute 
values of performance-matched working capital accruals; POST is an indicator variable for 
testing years after 2003; FIN46_CON is an indicator variable for firms consolidating VIEs (group 
1); SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by 
total assets; OCF is measured as operating cash flow divided by lagged total assets; SGROWTH is 
measured as the change in sales divided by lagged total assets; ROA is the income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; LOG_CYCLE is logarithm of operating cycle, 
which is measured as the sum of average days of accounts receivable and average days of 
inventory. 
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TABLE 14: Sample Deviation  
Group 1:                        
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 260
Number of non-financial firms that have non-missing values  135
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 1791
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 784
     
Group 
2:   
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 113
Number of non-financial firms that have non-missing values  66
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 845
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007 361
    
Group 3:    
Number of firms found in 10-K wizard 1077
Number of non-financial firms that have non-missing values  700
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1988 – 2012 8876
Number of observations for non-financial firms for year 1998 – 2007    4728
 
Note: this table provides the sample deviation for the tests on investment efficiency measured by 
the deviation from expected investment. Group 1 is defined for firms consolidating VIEs. Group 
2 is defined for firms restructuring or terminating VIES to avoid consolidating. Group 3 is 
defined for firms reporting no (material) impact from FIN 46. 260 firms are found for group 1 
through 10K wizard. After deleting firms with missing values to estimating variables and firms in 
financial industries, 135 firms left. There are 1791 firm-year observations from 1988 to 2012. 
There are 784 firm-year observations in the final sample for group 1 from 1998 to 2007. Using 
similar filtering process, group  2, 3 have 361 and 4728 firm-year observations respectively from 
1998 – 2007.  
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TABLE 15: Descriptive Statistics  
FIN 46 firms         
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD
INVEFF1 0.116 0.032 0.071 0.128 0.187
INVEFF2 0.099 0.024 0.051 0.109 0.187
INVEFF3 0.119 0.032 0.075 0.138 0.195
ROA -0.009 0.004 0.032 0.060 0.210
SIZE 7.109 5.897 7.246 8.517 1.974
MB 1.380 0.427 0.775 1.485 2.129
Tangibility 0.331 0.103 0.259 0.510 0.260
Kstructure 0.247 0.038 0.176 0.402 0.240
CFOsale -0.275 0.025 0.088 0.174 3.773
Slack 1.811 0.031 0.155 0.792 6.366
Dividend 0.527 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500
OPCycle 136.694 58.910 91.839 152.063 154.597
Loss 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422
N 893  
   
No Impact Firms    
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 SD
INVEFF1 0.193 0.048 0.112 0.209 0.299
INVEFF2 0.156 0.038 0.085 0.167 0.252
INVEFF3 0.174 0.046 0.107 0.197 0.267
ROA -0.147 -0.161 0.015 0.068 0.471
SIZE 4.308 3.122 4.337 5.546 2.099
MB 1.813 0.482 0.902 1.768 3.033
Tangibility 0.352 0.096 0.284 0.559 0.290
Kstructure 0.159 0.000 0.059 0.253 0.213
CFOsale -1.428 -0.083 0.053 0.170 7.648
Slack 2.347 0.009 0.149 1.052 7.751
Dividend 0.275 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.447
OPCycle 169.849 80.872 123.771 193.050 177.712
Loss 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.497
N 4263      
 
Note: this table presents the descriptive statistics for FIN 46 firms (group 1 and 2) and no impact 
firms (group 3). INVEFF1 is the absolute value of the residuals from equation (8). INVEFF2 is 
the absolute value of the residuals from equation (9). INVEFF3 is the absolute value of the 
residuals from equation (10). SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as 
total liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by 
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lagged total assets; MB is the market value of equity divided by total assets; Tangibility is 
measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; K-structure is 
measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value 
of equity; CFOsale is operating cash flow divided by sales; Slack is cash divided by 
property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a dividend; 
OPCycle is operating cycle measured as the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover 
and 365 divided by receivable turnover. 
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TABLE 16: Multivariate Regression Results for Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
   Investment 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.166 <0.0001 
    
POST -0.042 <0.0001 
    
FIN46 -0.024 0.105 
    
OCF -0.177 <0.0001 
    
FIN46*OCF -0.299 <0.0001 
    
POST*OCF 0.156 <0.0001 
    
POST*FIN46*OCF 0.591 <0.0001 
    
SIZE 0.001 0.762 
    
MB 0.027 <0.0001 
    
Adj. R2 21.82%   
N 4188   
 
Table 16 provides the regression results of the following model: 
 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t  +η3POST* OCFi,t  
                        + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t + b2MBi,t + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                        (11)                               
      
The test sample includes firms having VIEs affected by FIN 46 (group 1 and 2). The control 
sample includes firms reporting no (material) impact from FIN 46 (group 3). 
The dependent variable is Investment measured as the sum of research and development 
expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled 
by lagged total assets. MB is market value of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q.  
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TABLE 17 Regression Results for H3 
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity - FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
   Investment 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.212 <0.0001 
    
POST -0.051 <0.0001 
    
FIN46 -0.010 0.421 
    
OCF -0.406 <0.0001 
    
FIN46*OCF -0.056 0.247 
    
POST*OCF 0.351 <0.0001 
    
POST*FIN46*OCF 0.400 <0.0001 
    
SIZE -0.010 0.001 
    
MB 0.044 <0.0001 
    
Adj. R2 27.86%   
N 1456   
 
Table 17 provides the regression results of the following model: 
 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t  +η3POST* OCFi,t  
                        + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t + b2MBi,t + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                        (11)                               
      
The test sample includes firms having VIEs affected by FIN 46 (group 1 and 2). The control 
sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms. The dependent variable is Investment 
measured as the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and 
acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment scaled by 
lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets. MB is market value 
of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for Tobin’s Q. 
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TABLE 18:  
Deviation from Expected Investment Analyses: 
FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
   INVEFF1 INVEFF2 INVEFF3
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.082 0.000 0.089 <0.0001 0.072 0.001
   
POST 0.020 0.114 0.032 0.010 0.029 0.019
   
FIN46 0.026 0.024 0.030 0.006 0.027 0.014
   
POST*FIN46 -0.029 0.096 -0.039 0.017 -0.031 0.052
   
ROA -0.214 <0.0001 -0.218 <0.0001 -0.239 <0.0001
   
SIZE 0.000 0.918 -0.005 0.036 0.000 0.975
   
MB 0.014 <0.0001 0.015 <0.0001 0.015 <0.0001
   
Tangibility 0.023 0.266 0.016 0.421 0.024 0.218
   
Kstructure -0.014 0.561 0.008 0.730 -0.014 0.546
   
CFOsale -0.002 0.837 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.077
   
Slack -0.002 0.153 -0.001 0.561 0.000 0.950
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Dividend -0.006 0.497 -0.001 0.914 -0.004 0.648
   
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.664
   
LOSS -0.011 0.432 -0.004 0.794 -0.021 0.129
   
Adj. R2 6.52% 7.15% 6.37%  
N 970  884   884  
 
Table 18 presents the regression results of the following models: 
   
					ܫܸܰܧܨܨ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ∑ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௧                     (12)                                             
The test sample includes firms affected by FIN 46. The control sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms. The dependent variables 
INVEFF1, INVEFF2, INVEFF3 are the absolute values of the residuals from equation (8), (9) and (10) respectively.        
                                                
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGi,t-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ξi,t                                           (8) 
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ4 Investmenti,t-1 + ξi,t+1          (9)                                           
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1+ λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1 + ξi,t                                           (10)                                         
FIN46 is an indicator variable, 1 for firms with VIEs and affected by FIN 46, 0 for the matched pairs; POST is an indicator variable for testing 
years after 2003. The control variables are defined as the following: SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total 
liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; MB is the market value of equity 
divided by total assets; Tangibility is measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; K-structure is measured as long-term 
debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale is operating cash flow divided by sales; Slack is cash 
divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a dividend; OPCycle is operating cycle measured as 
the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover. 
                                                                                                                              
98 
 
Table 19: Additional Analysis of H3 
FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
 
  Alternative Model 1 Alternative Model 2 Alternative Model 3
   Investment Investment Investment
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.064 0.047 0.057 0.082 0.066 0.098
   
POST 0.036 0.056 0.046 0.015 0.044 0.046
   
FIN46 0.027 0.102 0.034 0.043 0.055 0.004
   
POST*FIN46 -0.044 0.071 -0.056 0.024 -0.076 0.008
   
ROA -0.345 <0.0001 -0.364 <0.0001 -0.520 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.001 0.896 -0.002 0.636 0.001 0.846
   
MB 0.033 <0.0001 0.027 <0.0001 0.044 <0.0001
   
Tangibility 0.117 0.000 0.102 0.001 0.106 0.003
   
Kstructure -0.026 0.438 -0.034 0.337 -0.034 0.401
   
CFOsale -0.003 0.837 0.018 0.303 0.048 0.017
   
Slack -0.006 0.001 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 0.034
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Dividend -0.024 0.070 -0.016 0.241 -0.005 0.766
   
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.139
   
LOSS -0.021 0.327 -0.030 0.164 -0.019 0.449
   
NEG -0.015 0.402 -0.025 0.172 -0.078 0.000
   
RevGrowth 0.172 <0.0001 0.154 <0.0001  
   
NEG*RevGrowth -0.152 0.043 -0.204 0.012  
   
Lag_Invest 0.138 <0.0001  
   
AssetGrowth 0.418 <0.0001
   
NEG*AssetGrowth -0.026 0.779
   
Adj. R2 43.67% 39.59% 18.76%  
N 970  884   884  
Table 19 presents the regression results of the following models: 
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ΣγControl +ξi,t                                                                        (13)                       
                                                                              
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t + λ 4 Investmenti,t-1 + ΣγControl +ξi,t                                              (14) 
                                                                      
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1+λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1+ΣγControl + ξi,t                                                                                (15) 
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The test sample includes firms affected by FIN 46. The control sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms. FIN46 is an indicator 
variable, 1 for firms with VIEs and affected by FIN 46, 0 for the matched pairs; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003.  
The dependent variable Investment is measured as the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition 
expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. FIN46 is an indicator variable for 
firms affected by FIN46; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is 
measured as total liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; MB is the 
market value of equity divided by total assets; Tangibility is measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; K-structure is 
measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale is operating cash flow divided by 
sales; Slack is cash divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a dividend; OPCycle is operating 
cycle measured as the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover; LOSS is an indicator variable, 1 if 
net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; RevGrowth is the annual revenue growth rate for firm i in year 
t; NEG is an indicator variable for negative revenue growth; Lag_Invest is lagged investment; AssetGrowth is logarithm of total assets in 
year t divided by total assets in year t-1, following McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Chen et al. (2011). 
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TABLE 20 Regression Results for H4 
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity - Group 1 vs. Group 2 
   Investment 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.192 <0.0001 
    
POST -0.079 <0.0001 
    
FIN46 -0.001 0.979 
    
OCF -0.073 0.698 
    
FIN46*OCF -0.419 0.028 
    
POST2003*OCF 0.448 0.053 
    
POST2003*FIN46*OCF 0.417 0.084 
    
SIZE -0.007 0.107 
    
MB 0.037 <0.0001 
    
Adj. R2 27.94%   
N 741   
Table 20 provides the regression results of the following model: 
 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t  +η3POST* OCFi,t  
                        + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t + b2MBi,t + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                        (11)                               
       
The test sample includes firms consolidating VIEs (group 1). The control sample includes firms 
terminating or restructuring VIEs (group 2). FIN46 is an indicator variables for firms in group 1; 
POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; The dependent variable is Investment 
measured as the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and 
acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment scaled by 
lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets. MB is market value 
of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for Tobin’s Q.  
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TABLE 21: Investment Efficiency: Firms consolidating VIEs versus Firms Terminating/Restructuring VIE H4 
Matched Pairs 
 
  Alternative Model 1 Alternative Model 2 Alternative Model 3
   Investment Investment Investment
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.059 0.067 0.052 0.115 0.057 0.155
   
POST 0.035 0.060 0.045 0.016 0.043 0.049
   
ONBOOK 0.020 0.274 0.027 0.152 0.037 0.086
   
OFFBOOK 0.041 0.070 0.049 0.032 0.090 0.001
   
POST*ONBOOK -0.052 0.054 -0.065 0.019 -0.075 0.019
   
POST*OFFBOOK -0.031 0.358 -0.040 0.226 -0.080 0.039
   
ROA -0.345 <0.0001 -0.363 <0.0001 -0.518 <0.0001
   
SIZE 0.000 0.987 -0.001 0.739 0.002 0.688
   
MB 0.033 <0.0001 0.028 <0.0001 0.044 <0.0001
   
Tangibility 0.122 <0.0001 0.107 0.001 0.114 0.001
   
Kstructure -0.033 0.329 -0.041 0.242 -0.046 0.262
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CFOsale -0.004 0.815 0.018 0.304 0.048 0.016
   
Slack -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.008 -0.005 0.056
   
Dividend -0.024 0.070 -0.015 0.243 -0.005 0.741
   
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.212
   
LOSS -0.018 0.402 -0.027 0.224 -0.014 0.583
   
NEG -0.017 0.337 -0.028 0.134 -0.080 0.000
   
RevGrowth 0.172 <0.0001 0.153 <0.0001  
   
NEG*RevGrowth -0.150 0.046 -0.200 0.014  
   
Lag_Invest 0.139 <0.0001  
   
AssetGrowth 0.434 <0.0001
   
NEG*AssetGrowth -0.021 0.824
   
Adj. R2 43.76% 39.74% 19.17%  
N 970  884   884  
 
Table 21 presents the regression results of the following models: 
 
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚସܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅	ߚହܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ 
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																												൅λ 1 NEGt-1 + λ 2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 ൅∑ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ξi,t                                                                                                     
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚସܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅	ߚହܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ 
																												൅	λ 1 NEGt-1 + λ 2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ∑ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + λ 4 Investmenti,t-1 +ξi,t                                                                       
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅ ߚସܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܰܤܱܱܭ௧ ൅	ߚହܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܱܨܨܤܱܱܭ௧ 
																												൅	λ 1 NEGt-1 + λ 2 AssetGrowthi,t-1 + λ 3 NEG*AssetGrowthi,t-1 ൅∑ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ξi,t                                                                                                     
                          
The test sample includes firms affected by FIN 46. The control sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms. ONBOOK is an indicator 
variable for firms consolidating VIEs; OFFBOOK is an indicator variable for firms terminating or restructuring VIEs; POST is an indicator 
variable for testing years after 2003. The dependent variable Investment is measured as the sum of research and development expenditure, 
capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. 
FIN46 is an indicator variable for firms affected by FIN46; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; SIZE is logarithm of 
lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as total liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets; MB is the market value of equity divided by total assets; Tangibility is measured as property, plant and equipment divided 
by total assets; K-structure is measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale is 
operating cash flow divided by sales; Slack is cash divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a 
dividend; OPCycle is operating cycle measured as the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover; 
LOSS is an indicator variable, 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; RevGrowth is the annual 
revenue growth rate for firm i in year t; NEG is an indicator variable for negative revenue growth; Lag_Invest is lagged investment; 
AssetGrowth is logarithm of total assets in year t divided by total assets in year t-1, following McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Chen et al. 
(2011). 
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TABLE 22: Additional Analysis of H4 
Group 1 and Matched Pairs 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
   INVEFF1 INVEFF2 INVEFF3
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.122 <0.0001 0.110 <0.0001 0.094 <0.0001
   
POST 0.030 0.061 0.039 0.006 0.028 0.043
   
FIN46 0.024 0.105 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.099
   
POST*FIN46 -0.036 0.097 -0.046 0.017 -0.028 0.137
   
ROA -0.156 0.002 -0.166 0.000 -0.185 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.004 0.256 -0.006 0.042 -0.001 0.812
   
MB 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.053 0.009 0.007
   
Tangibility -0.011 0.673 0.004 0.851 0.011 0.643
   
Kstructure -0.020 0.504 -0.028 0.316 -0.027 0.319
   
CFOsale 0.010 0.490 0.020 0.118 0.012 0.352
   
Slack -0.002 0.123 -0.001 0.515 0.000 0.936
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Dividend -0.003 0.822 0.002 0.872 -0.007 0.516
   
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.533
   
LOSS 0.002 0.897 0.012 0.471 -0.010 0.517
   
Adj. R2 5.13% 7.07% 5.94%  
N 662  604   604  
 
Table 22 presents the regression results of the following models: 
   
					ܫܸܰܧܨܨ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ∑ߛ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௧                     (12)                                             
The test sample includes firms affected by FIN 46. The control sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms. The dependent variables 
INVEFF1, INVEFF2, INVEFF3 are the absolute values of the residuals from equation (8), (9) and (10) respectively.        
                                                
 Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGi,t-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ξi,t                                           (8) 
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + λ4 Investmenti,t-1 + ξi,t+1          (9)                                           
Investmenti,t =λ0 + λ1 NEGt-1+ λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1 + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1 + ξi,t                                           (10)                                         
FIN46 is an indicator variable, 1 for firms consolidating VIEs (group 1), 0 for group 1 firms’ matched pairs; POST is an indicator variable for 
testing years after 2003. The control variables are defined as the following: SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is measured as 
total liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; MB is the market value of 
equity divided by total assets; Tangibility is measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; K-structure is measured as 
long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale is operating cash flow divided by sales; Slack is 
cash divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a dividend; OPCycle is operating cycle 
measured as the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover. 
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TABLE 23: Additional Analysis of H4 
Group 1 and Matched Pairs 
 
  Alternative Model 1 Alternative Model 2 Alternative Model 3
   Investment Investment Investment
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept 0.102 0.003 0.086 0.013 0.121 0.004
   
POST 0.033 0.099 0.038 0.056 0.036 0.124
   
FIN46 0.024 0.188 0.027 0.132 0.038 0.076
   
POST*FIN46 -0.055 0.039 -0.063 0.018 -0.072 0.021
   
ROA -0.259 <0.0001 -0.301 <0.0001 -0.418 <0.0001
   
SIZE -0.003 0.445 -0.001 0.710 -0.003 0.578
   
MB 0.025 <0.0001 0.019 0.000 0.028 <0.0001
   
Tangibility 0.103 0.002 0.107 0.001 0.101 0.009
   
Kstructure -0.047 0.205 -0.066 0.081 -0.084 0.059
   
CFOsale 0.006 0.740 -0.002 0.899 0.027 0.206
   
Slack -0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.058
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Dividend -0.022 0.142 -0.019 0.195 0.002 0.927
   
OPCYCLE 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.487
   
LOSS -0.014 0.547 -0.023 0.320 -0.009 0.748
   
NEG -0.022 0.277 -0.032 0.114 -0.078 0.001
   
RevGrowth 0.142 <0.0001 0.143 <0.0001  
   
NEG*RevGrowth -0.134 0.088 -0.188 0.027  
   
Lag_Invest 0.082 0.004  
   
AssetGrowth 0.263 0.002
   
NEG*AssetGrowth -0.004 0.972
   
Adj. R2 40.25% 41.62% 18.84%  
N 662  604   604  
 
Table 23 presents the regression results of the following models: 
 
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t-1 + ΣγControl +ξi,t                                                                        (13)                       
                                                                              
Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1 + λ2 SalesGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ 3 NEG* SalesGrowthi,t + λ 4 Investmenti,t-1 + ΣγControl +ξi,t                                              (14) 
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Investmenti,t =λ0 + ߚଵܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚଶܨܫܰ46௧ ൅ ߚଷܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൈ ܨܫܰ46௧ ൅	λ1 NEGt-1+λ2 AssetGrowthi,t-1  
                       + λ3 NEG* AssetGrowthi,t-1+ΣγControl + ξi,t                                                                                (15) 
 
The test sample only includes firms consolidating VIEs (group 1). The control sample includes the matched pairs of group 1 firms. FIN46 is 
an indicator variable, 1 for firms consolidating VIEs, 0 for the matched pairs; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003.  
The dependent variable Investment is measured as the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition 
expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. FIN46 is an indicator variable for 
firms affected by FIN46; POST is an indicator variable for testing years after 2003; SIZE is logarithm of lagged total assets; Leverage  is 
measured as total liability divided by total assets; ROA is the income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets; MB is the 
market value of equity divided by total assets; Tangibility is measured as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; K-structure is 
measured as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; CFOsale is operating cash flow divided by 
sales; Slack is cash divided by property, plant and equipment; Dividend is an indicator variable for firm paid a dividend; OPCycle is operating 
cycle measured as the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided by receivable turnover; LOSS is an indicator variable, 1 if 
net income before extraordinary items is negative and 0 otherwise; RevGrowth is the annual revenue growth rate for firm i in year 
t; NEG is an indicator variable for negative revenue growth; Lag_Invest is lagged investment; AssetGrowth is logarithm of total assets in 
year t divided by total assets in year t-1, following McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Chen et al. (2011). 
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TABLE 24: Regression Results for H1 
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity - Constrained and Unconstrained Groups 
 
  
Constrained Group 
Investment 
Unconstrained Group 
Investment 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.151 <0.0001 0.122 <0.0001 
    
POST -0.156 0.351 -0.067 <0.0001 
    
FIN46 -0.017 0.450 -0.024 0.174 
    
OCF -0.138 <0.0001 -0.277 <0.0001 
    
FIN46_OCF -0.375 <0.0001 -0.126 0.117 
    
POST_OCF 0.122 <0.0001 0.053 0.011 
    
POST*FIN46_OCF 0.767 <0.0001 0.305 0.066 
    
SIZE 0.003 0.469 0.005 0.130 
    
MB 0.026 <0.0001 0.048 <0.0001 
    
Adj. R2 20.03% 34.10%   
N 2063   2125   
 
Table 24 provides the regression results of the following model: 
 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t  +η3POST* OCFi,t  
                        + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t + b2MBi,t + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                        (11)                               
  
The test sample includes firms having VIEs affected by FIN 46 (group 1 and 2). The control 
sample includes firms reporting no (material) impact from FIN 46 (group 3). The whole sample is 
partitioned into two groups: constrained group and unconstrained group. I construct an index 
following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont et al. (2001) by using the following model: 
 
KZindex = -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.139*Leverage – 39.368*Dividends -
1.315*CashHoldings 
 
I assign the top (bottom) two quartiles as the financial constrained (unconstrained) group. 
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The dependent variable is Investment measured as the sum of research and development 
expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled 
by lagged total assets. MB is market value of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q.  
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TABLE 25: Regression Results for H1 
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity - FIN 46 Firms and Matched Pairs 
 
  
Constrained Group 
Investment 
Unconstrained Group 
Investment 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.206 <0.0001 0.221 <0.0001 
    
POST -0.050 0.014 -0.018 0.249 
    
FIN46 0.008 0.706 -0.027 0.079 
    
OCF -0.410 <0.0001 -0.399 <0.0001 
    
FIN46_OCF -0.093 0.252 0.042 0.508 
    
POST_OCF 0.428 <0.0001 0.135 0.157 
    
POST*FIN46_OCF 0.515 0.001 0.139 0.319 
    
SIZE -0.010 0.050 -0.013 0.001 
    
MB 0.045 <0.0001 0.046 <0.0001 
    
Adj. R2 28.25% 28.87%   
N 705   751   
 
Table 25 provides the regression results of the following model: 
 
Investmenti,t = b + η1POST + η2FIN46 + b1OCFi,t + η3FIN46* OCFi,t  +η3POST* OCFi,t  
                        + η3POST*FIN46* OCFi,t + b2MBi,t + b3Sizei,t + εi,t,                                        (11)                               
  
The test sample includes firms having VIEs affected by FIN 46 (group 1 and 2). The control 
sample includes the matched pairs of FIN 46 firms.The whole sample is partitioned into two 
groups: constrained group and unconstrained group. I construct an index following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Lamont et al. (2001) by using the following model: 
 
KZindex = -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.139*Leverage – 39.368*Dividends -
1.315*CashHoldings 
 
I assign the top (bottom) two quartiles as the financial constrained (unconstrained) group. 
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The dependent variable is Investment measured as the sum of research and development 
expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. OCF is operating cash flow scaled 
by lagged total assets. MB is market value of equity divided by total assets, which is a proxy for 
Tobin’s Q.  
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APPENDIX   
 
Variable Definitions 
Investment:  the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and   
acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and               
equipment scaled by beginning total assets  
SIZE: the log of total assets  
MB: market value of equity divided by total assets 
Tangibility: property, plant and equipment divided by total assets  
K-structure: long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of 
equity  
CFOsale: operating cash flow divided by sales  
Slack: cash divided by property, plant and equipment 
Dividend: indicator variable, 1 if the firm paid a dividend, 0 otherwise 
OPCycle: operating cycle, the sum of 365 divided by inventory turnover and 365 divided 
by receivable turnover 
Loss: indicator variable, 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative, 0 
otherwise 
ROA: income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
Leverage: total debts divided by total assets 
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